











Manuscript version: Author’s Accepted Manuscript 
The version presented in WRAP is the author’s accepted manuscript and may differ from the 
published version or Version of Record. 
 
Persistent WRAP URL: 
http://wrap.warwick.ac.uk/134814                             
 
How to cite: 
Please refer to published version for the most recent bibliographic citation information.  
If a published version is known of, the repository item page linked to above, will contain 
details on accessing it. 
 
Copyright and reuse: 
The Warwick Research Archive Portal (WRAP) makes this work by researchers of the 
University of Warwick available open access under the following conditions.  
 
Copyright © and all moral rights to the version of the paper presented here belong to the 
individual author(s) and/or other copyright owners. To the extent reasonable and 
practicable the material made available in WRAP has been checked for eligibility before 
being made available. 
 
Copies of full items can be used for personal research or study, educational, or not-for-profit 
purposes without prior permission or charge. Provided that the authors, title and full 
bibliographic details are credited, a hyperlink and/or URL is given for the original metadata 
page and the content is not changed in any way. 
 
Publisher’s statement: 
Please refer to the repository item page, publisher’s statement section, for further 
information. 
 







Accepted for Publication in The European Accounting Review 
 
EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE ON AUDIT QUALITY UNDER A DUAL MANDATORY 
















We thank Henrik Nilsson (editor) and the two anonymous reviewers, Julie Barrow, Jere 
Francis, Fani Kalogirou, Clive Lennox, Kevin McMeeking, and workshop and seminar 
participants at Exeter Business School, American Accounting Association, and Nanyang 









*^ Correspondence Address: Accounting and Control Area, SDA Bocconi School of 
Management, Via Sarfatti 10, 20136, Milan Italy. Telephone: +390258365404. Email:. 
angela.pettinicchio@unibocconi.it  
 Warwick Business School, Email. Joanne.Hortoon@wbs.ac.uk  
Paper Accepted by Henrki Nilsson 











EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE ON AUDIT QUALITY UNDER A DUAL MANDATORY 
AUDITOR ROTATION RULE 
 
Abstract 
Regulators in the US ruled against introducing mandatory firm rotations in addition to the 
existing rule for periodic partner rotations. In contrast, European regulators ruled in favour of 
a dual mandatory rotation rule in which both audit firm and audit partner rotations are 
required. Employing a unique setting where a dual regime of audit and firm rotations are 
required, we assess the net benefit (cost), of audit firm rotation incrementally to partner 
rotation. Specifically, we analyse several earnings-based measures of audit quality along with 
the market perception of audit quality. Controlling for partner rotation, we do not find that 
firm rotations have a positive incremental effect. In contrast, we find audit partner rotation 
under the dual regime appears to improve both the earnings-based measures of audit quality, 
and market perceptions of earnings. Our evidence suggests that any benefit arising from dual 
rotation is likely to be driven by the change in partner. However, whether the audit firm 
rotation should still be required is unclear, given that the observed benefits arising from the 










EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE ON AUDIT QUALITY UNDER A DUAL MANDATORY 
AUDITOR ROTATION RULE 
 
1. Introduction 
The audit process reduces agency costs by providing the market with ‘independent’ 
verification of financial information prepared by managers, thereby reducing the cost of the 
information exchange between managers and investors (Dopuch & Simunic, 1980; 1982). 
However, since management controls the process of auditor hiring and retention, there are 
quasi-rents associated with such auditing contracts (DeAngelo, 1981). Consequently, auditors 
have incentives to yield to pressure from management, implying the quality of the 
information contained in audited financial statements depends on the ability of the audit 
partner to resist such pressures (Becker, DeFond, Jiambalvo & Subramanyam, 1998). If the 
auditor does not remain independent in-fact, the auditor will be less likely to report the 
irregularities and audit quality will be impaired. 
A number of countries require audit partner mandatory rotation as a means of 
enhancing auditor independence (e.g., the US, Taiwan, Australia, as well EU member states) 
and thus audit quality. In response to the Financial Crisis in 2008 the EU passed a new 
regulation, effective as of June 2016, to strengthen auditor independence in-fact by requiring 
in addition to audit partner rotation - mandatory audit firm rotation every ten years, thus 
creating a dual rotation regime.1 This policy stands in stark contrast to US requirements. The 
US Congress in July 2013 ruled against adding mandatory rotation at the audit firm level to 
the already required audit partner rotation and, consequently, the Public Company 
Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB) removed audit firm rotation from its agenda. 
Notwithstanding that Europe and the US are heading in opposing directions, there is no 
 
1REGULATION (EU) No 537/2014. This regulation applies to public interest entities (PIEs), which essentially 
are publicly listed firms. Thus, the new regulation can be viewed as an attempt by the EU to increase oversight 




empirical evidence to date that investigates whether having both layers of rotation enhances 
auditor independence.  In the light of this void, we explore a setting which requires dual 
rotation of both audit firm and audit partner. Specifically, using an Italian sample for the 
period 2006-2012, we examine the incremental effect on audit quality of firm rotations, 
controlling for mandatory partner rotation.  
A number of arguments have been advanced in favour and against a mandatory audit 
firm or audit partner rotation. Supporting the general principle of mandatory rotations is the 
notion that it enhances an auditor’s independence in-fact2 because it reduces the familiarity 
effect, social bonding and economic dependence (Bell, Causholli, & Knechel, 2015; 
Cameran, Francis, Marra, & Pettinicchio, 2015). Arguments specifically opposing rotations 
are: that long tenure provides auditors with more client-specific knowledge; it imposes 
considerable switching and setup costs (Knapp, 1991; Johnson, Johnson, Khurana, & 
Reynolds, 2002; DeAngelo, 1981); and new audit firms may exert insufficient effort to 
overcome the lack of client-specific knowledge.3  
Empirical evidence pertaining to rotation rules is scarce and is only available for a 
single rotation rule. A few papers examine the effects of mandatory partner rotations (e.g., 
Chi, Huang, Liao, & Xie, 2009, in Taiwan), or mandatory and regulator-imposed firm 
rotations (e.g., Kim, Min, & Yi, 2004, in Korea; Nagy, 2005, following the demise of Arthur 
Andersen in US; Cameran et al., 2015; Cameran, Prencipe & Trombetta., 2016; and Corbella, 
Florio, Gotti, & Mastrolia, 2015, in Italy) and provide inconsistent results as to whether such 
rotations improves audit quality.  
It is unclear ex-ante whether requiring two layers of rotation can generate any 
incremental net benefits over a single rotation rule. Dual rotation may increase the frequency 
 
2Independence in-fact is defined a state of mind that is unaffected by influences that might compromise 
professional judgement and allows an individual to act with integrity and or exercise objectivity and 
professional scepticism (International Federation of Accountants, 2004). 
3The literature on audit tenure indicates higher rate of audit failures during the initial engagement period (Geiger 




of the fresh-eyes effect, and/or lead to greater criticism by the outgoing auditor, but at the 
same time may reduce incentives for auditors to invest in acquiring client-specific knowledge 
relative to a single rotation rule. While the balance of these effects is hard to predict, it is 
possible it is different under a dual rotation rule than under a single rotation rule. Moreover, 
because audit partner and firm rotations have been studied separately, one cannot draw safe 
conclusions from the empirical evidence as to how audit quality would be affected when 
requiring both rotation types.   
Italy has required mandatory rotation of audit firms since 1975 (Presidential Decree 
D.P.R. 136/1975), with a maximum audit tenure of nine years. However, since 2006, 
following the major accounting scandals of the last decade (Enron, Parmalat), Italian 
legislators introduced an additional requirement to mandatory rotate the engagement partner 
after a maximum of six years,4 in line with EU regulation. More specifically, the dual regime 
requires an audit firm rotation after nine years, and a partner rotation after six years. This 
provides us with a rich set to investigate how audit quality varies with both rotation types. 
To assess the effect of each rotation type incrementally to the other, we employ a 
number of discrete tests, as suggested by DeFond & Zhang (2014). The first test examines 
whether each rotation type improves auditors’ independence in-fact and thereby improves 
audit quality.  Independence in-fact is unobservable; but consistent with prior studies we 
assume variations in audit quality are associated with variations in the audit firm’s or 
partner’s level of independence in-fact. We employ a number of earnings-based measures of 
audit quality including abnormal accruals, and discretionary revenues. The second test 
examines whether rotation improves auditor independence in-appearance – thereby enhancing 
the market perception of audit quality. The perception-based measure employed is based on 
the informativeness of reported earnings. If rotation improves the perception of auditor 
 




independence, even if independence in-fact has not improved, we would expect to see a 
closer relation between returns and reported earnings (Carcello & Li, 2013). A perception-
based measure also has the unique advantage over other output-based measures, as it allows 
us to observe investors’ views of the perceived benefits and costs of such regulatory 
intervention (DeFond & Zhang, 2014). 
Using our entire sample, controlling for partner rotations, we do not find that audit firm 
rotation incrementally improves audit quality. In contrast, we find that under the dual audit 
rotation regime, mandatory audit partner rotation appears to improve audit quality given it is 
incrementally associated with all our measures of audit quality. This improvement is 
economically as well as statistically significantly correlated with partner rotation, resulting in, 
between 36% and 26% reduction in our earnings-based measures of audit quality. With 
respect to market perception of audit quality of rotations, we find investors appear to perceive 
a net benefit from audit partner rotation, but a net cost from audit firm rotation. Specifically 
audit partner rotation appears to improve earnings informativeness relative to all non-rotation 
years, unlike audit firm rotation which diminishes it.  
The audit quality results are robust to an alternative specification. When we restrict the 
sample to include the year of rotation and the preceding year only, we find that improvement 
in audit quality is related to the arrival of a new partner. However we do not find investors’ 
perceptions of rotations differ in earnings informativeness during this two year period.  
Given the lack of association we find between audit quality and audit-firm rotation 
under the dual system, we also investigate whether this reflects a relative change in benefits 
(costs) of audit firm rotation under a single rotation system. We find that prior to the 
introduction of the dual system, audit firm rotation was largely unrelated to all our measures 
of discretionary earnings. In other words, we find little evidence that under either the dual or 




Additionally, we do not find evidence supporting an incremental change in earnings 
informativeness due to audit firm rotation under the dual system relative to the single system.  
Collectively, our findings suggest that in a dual audit regime it is the audit partner 
rotation, not the audit firm rotation, that improves both audit quality and the investors’ 
perceptions of audit quality. One explanation of our findings is that any benefits of changing 
the audit partner – which also occurs when the audit firm changes – are cancelled out by also 
changing the audit firm. If this explanation is correct, it raises doubt over whether audit-firm 
rotation is any longer desirable or necessary when audit-partner rotation is required. Thus, 
this explanation provides support for the PCAOB’s decision to abandon its effort to require 
audit firm rotation, in addition to the five-year partner rotation requirement. 
However, an alternative explanation is that mandatory audit firm rotation is a necessary 
precondition for the observed effectiveness of audit partner rotation. Specifically, the rotating 
audit partner’s incentives will be influenced by whether she is replaced internally or by a new 
audit firm. Partner rotations without firm rotations may not provide a sufficiently strong 
incentive to enhance audit quality to either the outgoing or incoming partner. The idea is that 
any correction of poor auditing could hurt the audit firm’s reputation, or simply face a strong 
resistance from the client. Hence, as long as the audit firm does not expect to be replaced, 
poor auditing may persist. In contrast, under the dual rotation rule, knowing that a new audit 
firm will be taking over, the incumbent partner is exposed to the risk that the new auditor 
would demand a correction. Thus, the incumbent partner is likely to increase audit effort. 
Reputation effects also suggest the previous partner within the same audit firm faces a strong 




‘embarrassment effect,’ if their poor audit quality is revealed by the new audit firm (Lennox, 
Wu, & Zhang 2014).5  
A recent paper by Gipper, Hail, & Leuz (2018) fails to find evidence that partner 
rotations improve audit quality in the U.S. If their results are applicable to our Italian setting, 
it potentially provides some support for the explanation that firm rotation is a precondition for 
the benefits of partner rotation; otherwise we would expect to see no benefit of partner 
rotation consistent with Gipper et al. (2018). Unfortunately, because we do not have the 
counterfactual evidence, i.e., a single audit partner rotation regime in Italy, we are unable to 
explicitly test these competing explanations. 
We contribute to the literature on auditor rotations in several ways. First, we are the 
first, to the best of our knowledge, to examine audit quality under a dual rotation rule. We are 
thus able to assess the incremental effect on audit quality of one rotation type over the other. 
Second, our evidence should be of use to regulators who consider, and in some cases require, 
mandatory firm and partner rotations. Specifically, in early 2014 the PCAOB, under political 
pressure, abandoned its effort to require audit firm rotation, in addition to the five-year 
partner rotation requirement (Ryan, 2014). In the EU, the final rule requiring a 10-year 
rotation – extendable to 20 years - is a watered-down version of the initial proposal for six 
years (Abela, 2015). Third, because prior research examined a single rotation regime, mostly 
for partners, its relevance for regulators considering a dual rotation arrangement is limited. 
We thus contribute to the literature by providing evidence that speaks more directly to the 
effects of partner rotations under a dual rotation regime. Finally, our analysis of the period 
prior to 2006 extends the small body of research examining a single audit firm rotation rule. 
 
5This is consistent with Lennox, Wu, & Zhang (2014, p. 1777) who refer to the embarrassment effect as 
follows: “[T]he departing partner has an incentive to conduct a higher quality audit in his/her final year t in 
order to avoid the embarrassment of the audit deficiencies being found by the incoming partner in year t+1.” 





In particular, our evidence suggests firm rotations alone do not improve audit quality, 
although potentially when combined with partner rotations they may have a positive impact.  
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents our motivation 
and prior literature. Section 3 describes the sample and research design where Section 4 
presents the main results. Additional analyses are reported in Section 5 while Section 6 
concludes.  
2. Motivation and prior literature 
Mandatory audit-firm rotation has been on the regulatory agenda of many countries reflecting 
a concern that long association with the client impairs auditor’s independence and leads to the 
deterioration of, and the perception of, audit quality. 
In the European Union, audit-firm rotation was optional in the Directive (2006/43/EC), 
until the passing of Regulation (EU) No 537/2014 in June 2016, which now requires audit-
firm rotation every ten years with an additional ten years if tendering takes place. While it is 
not a-priori clear this regulation would enhance auditor independence in-fact, regulators may 
have been motivated to set rules that enhance auditor independence in-appearance (Dopuch, 
King, & Schwartz, 2003).6  
The debate on the advantages and disadvantages of mandatory audit-firm rotation is 
extensive. Proponents of rotation rules often refer to a “professional routine” (Shockley, 
1981), and “familiarity effect” that are associated with a long-standing relationship between 
the management and the auditor (Mautz & Sharaf, 1961; Farmer, Rittenberg, & Trompeter, 
1987; Brody & Moscove, 1998; Bell et al., 2015; Cameran et al., 2015), which adversely 
 
6The international Federation of Accountants (IFAC) defines independence as follows: “Independence of mind – 
the state of mind that permits the expression of a conclusion without being affected by influences that 
compromise professional judgement, thereby allowing an individual to act with integrity, and exercise 
objectivity and professional skepticism. Independence in appearance – the avoidance of facts and circumstances 
that are so significant that a reasonable and informed third party would be likely to conclude that a firm’s or an 
audit or assurance team member’s integrity, objectivity or professional skepticism has been compromised.” 
(See, https://www.ifac.org/system/files/publications/files/Final-Pronouncement-The-Restructured-Code_0.pdf.) 
Dopuch et al. (2003, p. 84) provides definitions similar in spirit although he uses the term “independence in-




affects reporting quality (Bazerman, Morgan, & Lowenstein, 1997). Auditor rotation 
potentially reduces the familiarity threat, by bringing in “fresh eyes” (AICPA, 1978; Hoyle, 
1978; McLaren, 1958), as well as changing the incumbent auditor’s incentives due to the 
potential “embarrassment effect” (i.e. new auditor may criticize their work).7   
Opponents of mandatory rotation warn of the risk of loss of client-specific knowledge 
(e.g., PWC, 2012), and its adverse effect on reporting quality (Petty & Cuganesan, 1996; 
Geiger & Raghumamdan, 2002; Myers, Myers, & Omer, 2003; Carcello & Nagy, 2004). 
Mandated firm rotations at fixed intervals may also involve repeated low balling of fees, 
erosion of incentives to invest in client-specific knowledge, and lower audit effort 
(DeAngelo, 1981; Elitzur & Falk, 1996; Cameran et al., 2015).  
These arguments are generally valid for both rotation types – audit-firm and audit-
partner - however there are a number of noteworthy differences, which may influence audit 
quality. Bamber, Bamber, & Michael (2009) note with partner rotations the potential for 
judgment errors is relatively moderate given that the audit firm methodology, prior working 
papers and audit team members largely remain intact. Moreover, the “low balling” at partner 
level may not be present so the threat to audit quality is also lower (Palmrose, 1986). On the 
other hand, the new partner is nominated from within the same audit team so the benefit of 
fresh-eyes may be lower than under firm rotation.  
It is a-priori unclear what the effects of combining mandatory partner and mandatory 
firm rotations may be. While the overall benefits (or costs) of rotation is an empirical issue, it 
is quite possible it is different under a dual than under a single rotation rule. Auditors and 
prepares overall tend to stress the costs of a dual regime, such as higher risk of audit errors 
 
7Consistent with this, Cameran et al. (2015) provide evidence that audit fee and effort are higher prior to 
mandatory firm rotations. However, as we report later, we do not find evidence consistent with improved 




and misreporting along with higher internal costs (PWC, 2012).8 However, European 
regulators argue that a dual system would increase audit quality and investors’ confidence in 
financial information (e.g., Barnier, 20139).  
2.1. Prior empirical evidence 
Direct evidence on the effect of either mandatory firm rotations or partner rotations (within 
the same firm) is very sparse owing to data limitations. To overcome this limitation, prior 
research has attempted instead to provide indirect evidence by examining the role of tenure or 
voluntary rotations on reporting quality. However, it should be noted that this indirect 
evidence may not accurately inform the mandatory rotation debate, as conditions and 
incentives may not be directly comparable (Johnson et al., 2002; Ewelt-Knauer, Gold, & Pott, 
2012; Casterella & Johnson, 2013; Kwon, Lim, & Simnett, 2014; Lennox, 2014; Cameran et 
al., 2016).  
2.1.1. Direct evidence on mandatory firm rotations 
Only a few countries have required regular audit-firm rotations before the recent changes in 
the EU (among these are Italy [since 1975], South Korea [2006-2010] and Spain [1989-
1995]).10 A small number of studies have investigated the Italian setting (Cameran et al., 
2015; Cameran et al., 2016; Corbella et al., 2015). Cameran et al. (2016) examine variations 
in audit quality before the dual regime. During their sample period the incumbent audit firm 
was nominated for an initial three-year period, renewable twice up to a maximum of nine 
years. They find auditors become more conservative in the last three-year period, compared 
to the previous six years. Cameran et al. (2015), finds the first three years of an incumbent 
auditor are less conservative, compared to the following six years. It is unclear from these 
results as to whether the increase in accounting conservatism in the later periods is due to the 
 
8See http://pcaobus.org/rules/rulemaking/pages/docket037comments.aspx, comment letter No. 136. 
9See http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/auditing/reform/. 




imminent mandatory rotation and the need to reduce any embarrassment effect, or that it 
merely reflects a learning curve due to a longer tenure period.11 Unfortunately, one cannot 
disentangle these two explanations. Cameran et al. (2016) also find a marginal increase in the 
earnings response coefficient in the last three-year period of engagement compared to the 
prior periods. This suggests that Italian investors’ perception of audit quality tends to improve 
in the final engagement period, prior to mandatory rotation. However, their results could also 
suggest independence in-fact does not increase as audit quality may be lower under the new 
auditor.  
Both Cameran et al. (2015) and Corbella et al. (2015) explicitly investigate the year of 
rotation and find no significant impact on audit quality in either the year of rotation or year 
before rotation. In Spain Ruiz-Barbadillo, Gómez-Aguilar, & Carrera (2009) find no evidence 
of any significant change in auditors’ economic incentives to issue biased reports between 
these two periods. Kwon et al. (2014) examine the effect of mandatory audit firm rotation on 
audit hours, audit fees, and audit quality in South Korea and find similar results to Cameran 
et al. (2015). In contrast, Kim & Yi (2009) find audit quality improved after the passage of 
the mandatory rotation rule.  
2.1.2. Direct evidence on mandatory partner rotations 
Partner rotations within the same audit firm have been required for some years in the EU, 
Australia, U.S., and some other countries. However, evidence is limited given audit partner 
names were only recently required to be disclosed (e.g. PCAOB, 2015; Statutory Audit 
Directive, 2006/43/EC)) 
We are only aware of five studies on mandatory partner rotations, one in Taiwan (Chi 
et al., 2009), three in China (Firth, Rui, & Wui, 2012; Lennox, 2014; Lennox, et al., 2014) 
 
11Both studies in robustness tests find tenure is associated with audit quality; longer tenure is associated with 




and two in the US (Laurion, Lawrence, & Ryan, 201612; Gipper et al., 2018). Lennox (2014) 
and Lennox et al. (2014) find mandatory audit-partner rotation results in higher audit quality 
in the year immediately surrounding rotation and Firth et al. (2012) find a higher incidence of 
issuing a modified audit opinion. Chi et al. (2009) find no evidence that reporting quality of 
companies subject to mandatory audit partner rotation improves. However, in both China and 
Taiwan there are two partners that are responsible for the audit, with both partners required to 
rotate in Taiwan, but only one partner is rotating in China. Thus, this evidence is of limited 
relevance for many countries in which there is a single partner. 
In the US, Gipper et al. (2018) find little support for fresh-look benefits on audit quality 
after the five-year mandatory rotation period. They also find the outgoing partner spends 
fewer hours in the last two years of the engagement relative to the previous three, which is 
inconsistent with the embarrassment effect. Laurion et al. (2016) document an increase in 
restatements following partner rotations, suggesting audit quality improves with partner 
rotations, but it is not associated with an embarrassment effect for the outgoing auditor. 
2.1.3. Indirect evidence: the role of tenure and voluntary switches 
Since mandatory rotations limit auditor tenure, the literature has attempted to identify 
whether long (short) tenure is associated with poorer (better) reporting quality. US-based 
evidence suggests short (long) firm tenure is associated with poorer (better) reporting quality 
(Johnson et al. 2002; Geiger & Raghunandan, 2002; Myers et al. 2003). In contrast, in 
Taiwan, Chi & Huang (2005) find abnormal accruals decline in the first years of the audit 
firm tenure but increase afterwards, while Chen, Lin, & Lin (2008) fail to document a relation 
between accruals and tenure. In Belgium, Knechel & Vanstraelen (2007) do not find any 
effect of long tenure on the issuance of going-concern opinion. To the extent that long tenure 
may improve earnings quality, then the client’s cost of capital and cost of debt are also 
 
12Although Laurion et al. (2016) cannot identify which partner rotations are mandatory and which are voluntary, 




expected to decrease with tenure. Mansi, Maxwell, & Miller (2004), Ghosh & Moon (2005) 
and Boone, Khurana, & Raman (2008) report evidence consistent with this hypothesis.  
 With respect to partner tenure and voluntary rotation,13 Carey, & Simnett (2006) find 
mixed evidence on the association between audit partner tenure and reporting quality in 
Australia. Chen et al. (2008) find a positive link between reporting quality and partner tenure 
in Taiwan. Fargher, Lee, & Mande (2008) find evidence that voluntary partner rotations in 
Australia are associated with poorer audit quality, although audit quality improves in the 
subsequent years for partner rotations within the same audit-firm. Hallman, Kartapanis & 
Schmidt (2018) find incumbent auditors who are aware they are going to be replaced by the 
client enhance audit quality broadly consistent with the embarrassment effect. However, 
Hamilton, Ruddock, Stokes, & Taylor (2011) find no difference in discretionary accruals and 
reporting conservatism in the year preceding and year following a voluntary partner change 
(see also Fargher et al., 2008). 
Summarizing this literature, we note the paucity of evidence on mandatory rotations, 
either at the firm level or at the partner level. Moreover, there is no direct evidence on 
regimes involving both rotation types. The indirect evidence, while richer, is obtained under 
voluntary regimes which may be influenced by other factors that are irrelevant for mandatory 
changes (e.g., client’s financial distress and breakdown in relationship). Therefore, we cannot 
infer from these findings the likely impact of a mandatory dual rotation (Carey & Simnett, 
2006, and Lennox, 2014). It is an open empirical question as to whether there is any 
incremental benefit of adding audit firm rotation to a regime which already requires partner 
rotation.  
3. Sample and research design 
 
13Voluntary auditor changes may be caused by a variety of reasons including the health of the client-firm, the 
need to realign the needs of managers, severity of audit opinion and overly conservative auditors (See DeFond 




The sample consists of Italian non-financial companies listed on the Milan Stock Exchange 
during the period 1993 to 2012. In May 2006, following EU Directive 2006/43/EC, effective 
19 June 2006, Italy has required mandatory partner rotation every six years.14 Additionally, 
there is a rule of no re-hiring within three years. Prior to 2006 an audit firm was hired for a 
period of three years, with the engagement renewable twice to a total of nine years (so a 
3+3+3 system). However, following the introduction of the audit partner rotation in 2006, 
audit firm tenure of the incumbent audit firm was restricted to a straight nine years; removing 
the 3+3+3 system.  When investigating the dual mandatory rotation regime, we focus on the 
period 2006 to 2012. All sample firms report under International Financial Reporting 
Standards (IFRS), as promulgated by the IASB and required in the EU since 2005.  
The audit market in Italy is an interesting setting to study the effect of rotations because 
the stock market is small and most publicly listed firms are audited by the Big-4 firms (which 
is also the case in many other audit markets). The analysis of Gietzmann & Sen (2002) 
indicates that in such markets the risk of auditor-client collusion is high and so mandatory 
rotations may be an effective tool to limit this behaviour. Furthermore, anti-trust investigation 
carried out in 2000 found evidence of collusion in fee pricing among big Italian audit firms 
(Cameran, 2005). If fees and, hence audit effort, are fixed, it is a-priori unclear that audit 
effort would be affected by firm rotations.15 
Accounting data are taken from Compustat Global (industrial/commercial issue). The 
names of the audit firm and audit partner were hand-collected from financial statements, 
available online or on the cd-rom Borsa Italiana.16 The final sample for the period 2006-2012 
consists of 1,100 client-year observations (227 client-firms belonging to 11 industries17). In 
 
14In particular, a break was mandated in 2006 for all partner engagements which in that year had a duration of 
six years or more.  
15See Cameran (2005) for further detail on the Italian audit market. 
16Audit firm data are also available on Compustat, but many mistakes were found. For this reason, audit firm 
identity was manually checked against the client’s annual report. 




total, we have 76 firm mandatory rotations, and 150 partner mandatory rotations (which 
include firm rotations). In additional analyses we examine a sample that includes the period 
preceding the introduction of mandatory partner rotations. The resultant extended sample 
period of 1993-2012 contains 2,104 firm year observations (inclusive of 141 firm mandatory 
rotations). All the samples exclude firm-years with voluntary partner or voluntary firm 
rotations. 18 
3.1. Measures of Audit Quality 
High-quality audit is characterized by its ability to constrain management’s self-serving 
accounting choices (Jones, 1991; Dechow, 1994; Subramanyam, 1996;  DeFond & 
Jiambalvo, 1994; Dechow, Sloan, & Sweeney, 1995; Wysocki, 2004). Since audit quality is 
unobservable, we regard reported earnings as the outcome of a process in which the auditors 
influence clients’ reporting decisions (Antle & Nalebuff, 1991), and so earnings are also a 
function of audit quality (e.g., Becker et al., 1998). We therefore employ a number of 
different measures of audit quality, each possibly capturing different dimensions of audit 
quality (DeFond & Zhang, 2014). In addition, we also examine the market’s perception of 
earnings quality (DeFond & Zhang, 2014).  
3.1.1. Accounting-based measures of audit quality – abnormal accruals 
Building on prior research, we employ three measures of audit quality, including two 
measures of abnormal accruals and one measure of discretionary revenues. The first is 
absolute abnormal working capital accruals (AAWCA). Following DeFond & Park (2001) and 
Carey & Simnett (2006), abnormal working capital accruals are defined as:  
AAWCAi,t= |WCi,t- WCi,t-1* 
Si,t
Si,t-1
|                                                                                 (1) 
where WCi,t is the actual level of working capital observed in year t for firm i, scaled by total 
assets. In particular (ignoring the index i and scaling): 
 




WC𝑡 =  (Current assetst − Casht − Short term investmentst) − (Current liabilitiest −
Short term debt𝑡)                                                                                              (2) 
The second term (WCi,t-1* 
Si,t
Si,t-1
) in Equation (1) represents the predicted value of 
working capital, calculated as  prior year’s working capital adjusted for the change in sales. 
As noted by Wysocki (2004), this measure of abnormal accruals is particularly suitable for 
this sample, because the Italian stock market is relatively young and small. We use the 
absolute measure of AWCA consistent with extant prior research (e.g., Carey & Simnett, 
2006; Fargher et al., 2008; Carcello, & Li, 2013) to mitigate the concern that there is an 
offsetting effect in signed accruals between positive and negative abnormal accruals. 
The second measure of audit quality, following Dechow & Dichev (2002) and 
McNichols (2002), is the absolute value of the regression residual (ADD):  
CAi,t = α + β1CFOi,t-1 + β2CFOi,t +  β3CFOi,t+1 + β4ΔRevi,t+  β5PPEi,t+ εi,t                  (3) 
where current accrual (CA) is net income before extraordinary items, plus depreciation and 
amortization, minus operating cash flows, scaled by beginning of year total assets. The 
inclusion of the three operating cash flows stems from the accounting process, whereby 
accruals allocate to current income past, present and past cash flows (Dechow & Dichev, 
2002). One limitation of the Dechow & Dichev (2002) model is that the limited time series of 
operating cash flows leaves out fundamental factors that may affect accruals. McNichols 
(2002) suggests that this limitation can be mitigated by the inclusion of change in sales 
(ΔRev) and property plant and equipment (PPE). The residual thus captures the part in current 
accruals that is not attributed to the time series of cash flows and other fundamentals. It 
therefore proxies for managerial discretion in accruals. 
The third measure of audit quality is the absolute value of discretionary revenues 




Specifically, ARESREV is the absolute value of the residual from a model that relates the 
change in accounts receivables to the change in revenues: 
                                   ΔARi,t = α + βΔRevi,t + εi,t                                                         (4) 
where ΔARi,t is annual change in accounts receivable and ΔRevi,t is the annual change in 
revenues, each scaled by beginning total assets. Stubben (2010) argues this measure is subject 
to a smaller measurement error and bias than other measures of discretionary accruals. 
Additionally, manipulating earnings is commonly carried out at the revenue recognition level. 
3.1.2. Market perceptions of audit quality 
To measure a market-based proxy of audit quality we follow recent studies (Carcello & Li, 
2013; Cameran et al., 2015) and examine how the earnings response coefficient (ERC) from 
the regression of stock returns on rotation variables and various controls varies with 
mandatory rotations. ERC is a common measure of earnings informativeness, reflecting 
investors’ perceptions of audit quality. DeFond & Zhang (2014) argue that although this is an 
indirect measure of audit quality, it is more comprehensive because it also captures auditor’s 
influence on disclosure quality and subtler audit deficiencies. This approach captures the 
effect of rotations on perception in-appearance of auditor independence, 
3.2. Regression models 
3.2.1. Audit quality 
To examine the incremental effect on audit quality of adding audit partner rotations, to a 
regime that already requires audit firm rotation, we estimate the following model (omitting 
firm i and time t indexing): 
AQ = α0 + α1PMROT + α2FMROT + α3AGE + α4BIG + α5SIZE + α6LOSS + α7LEV +             
α8GROWTH + α9ROA + α10CFO + Year F.E. + Firm F.E. + ε                                                     (5) 
where AQ is either AAWCA, ADD or ARESREV, as defined above. Our main variables of 




audit firm rotates, and zero otherwise, and FMROT, which takes the value of one if the audit 
firm rotates, and zero otherwise. More specifically, all firm rotations taking place within the 
nine-year period are deemed as voluntary. If a partner serves for six years following a firm 
rotation, then we identify the seventh year as a mandatory partner rotation. Partner rotations 
following a tenure of less than six years, or less than three years in the case of a partner 
replacing a six-year partner, are regarded as voluntary. If partner tenure is three years and is 
preceded by partner tenure of six years and ends with a firm rotation, we classify this as a 
mandatory firm and partner rotation. This coding reflects the fact that, whenever the audit 
firm changes, the partner also changes. The coefficient on FMROT therefore measures the 
incremental effect of rotating audit firm over and above the effect of partner rotating. Finding 
that  a particular type of rotation is positively (negatively) associated with AQ, would suggest 
that this rotation type is associated with poorer (better) audit quality.    
We also include a number of client-specific control variables based on the prior 
literature. These include: firm age (AGE), the number of years the client company has been 
listed on the Milan Stock Exchange (Anthony & Ramesh, 1992; Carey & Simnett, 2006); 
Big-4 auditor indicator (BIG) (Becker et al., 1998; Francis, Maydew, & Sparks, 1999); the 
size of the client-firm (SIZE), since abnormal accruals are found to be negatively related to 
firm size (Johnson et al., 2002; Cameran et al., 2015 and Cameran et al., 2016). We  include a 
number of additional variables which control for the client’s incentives to manage earnings. 
The first is an indicator variable if the firm made a prior year loss (LOSS).19 We do so since 
firms who report a loss in the previous year are expected to engage more aggressively in 
earnings management in order to avoid showing losses in the current financial year (Carey & 
Simnett, 2006; Cameran et al., 2015). Additionally, we include leverage (LEV), since 
earnings management is often used to avoid violation of debt covenants (DeFond & 
 




Jiambalvo, 1994; Carey & Simnett, 2006); firm growth (GROWTH) controls for the impact of 
growth on accruals (Carey & Simnett, 2006), while return on assets (ROA), which is based on 
earnings before extraordinary items (Carcello & Li, 2013), controls for the possibility that 
abnormal accruals are influenced by underlying profitability (Kothari, Leone & Wasley, 
2005). Finally, we include operating cash-flows (CFO) as an accruals-free measure of 
performance (Davis, Soo & Trompeter, 2009; Carcello & Li, 2013).   
3.2.2. Earnings informativeness analysis 
To test how the market perceives the incremental benefit of mandatory partner rotation and 
firm rotation, using the level of earnings informativeness, we run the following model, which 
is based on Carcello & Li (2013) (omitting firm i and time t indexing): 
RET = α0 + α1PMROT + α2FMROT + α3AGE + α4BIG + α5SIZE + α6LOSS + α7LEV + 
α8GROWTH + α9ROA + α10CFO + α11PMROT*ROA + α12FMROT*ROA + 
α13AGE*ROA + α14BIG*ROA + α15SIZE*ROA + α16LOSS*ROA + α17LEV*ROA + 
α18GROWTH*ROA + α19CFO*ROA + Year F.E + Firm F.E. + ε,                               (6) 
where RET is client firm’s stock return over the fiscal year.  Note that α9 is the ERC in non-
rotation years. The main variables of interest in this analysis are the interactions: 
PMROT*ROA and FMROT*ROA. In particular, to the extent that mandatory partner rotation 
is associated with higher (lower) earnings informativeness (i.e., higher, or lower, ERC), the 
coefficient α11 is expected to be positive (negative). To the extent that mandatory firm 
rotation is associated with incremental increase (decrease) in earnings informativeness, α12 is 
expected to be positive (negative). 
In all regression models above, we also control for year and firm fixed effects and all 
regressions utilize robust variance estimates clustered at the individual firm level to control 
for potential bias in the estimates (Petersen, 2009). All continuous variables are winzorised at 




4. Empirical results 
4.1. Descriptive statistics and univariate analysis 
Panel A of Table 1 reports the descriptive statistics of all the variables in Equations (5) and 
(6).   AAWCA has a mean (median) value of 0.101 (0.042), which is comparable to Cameran 
et al. (2015) (0.085 and 0.039, respectively). ADD has a mean (median) value of 0.038 
(0.025) and ARESREV a mean (median) of 0.049 (0.028). We also report the descriptives for 
the signed measures, AWCA, DD and RESREV. The mean values of AWCA and RESREV are 
consistent with conservative accounting. Annual stock return (RET) is negative, on average 
with a return of -3.5%. We find mandatory partner rotations, either within the same audit firm 
or as a result of change in audit firm, occur in almost 14% of firm-year observations and audit 
firm rotation of 7% of firm-year observations. This implies the rate of partner rotations within 
the same audit firm in the sample is also about 7% (or half of all mandatory rotations).  
As for the control variables, client firms are mature, with an average age of 17 years. 
Most clients are audited by Big-4 audit firms (86%), about 18% report a prior loss, have an 
average ratio of debt to total assets (LEV) of 0.265, and show sales growth of 8.8%.20 Though 
the rate of loss reporting is small, the average ROA is negative. Nevertheless, the median 
firm is profitable (ROA = 0.015). Operating cash flow is positive (mean = 0.048).   
Panel B of Table 1 reports the distribution of rotation types per year for the 2006-2012 
period. Of the 150 partner rotations 40 occurred in 2006; this large number reflects the fact 
the rule was applied retrospectively. Additionally, 2008 is characterized by a large number of 
rotations, both at the firm and partner levels (31 & 23, respectively). We are not aware, 
however, of any particular underlying cause for such a high frequency. Panel C of Table 1 
compares rotation years where only the partner changes (i.e., 74 within the incumbent audit 
 
20The mean and median values of our leverage ratio are lower than what is reported by Cameran et al. (2016) 
(0.53 & 0.55, respectively). However, we account only for debt liabilities whereas Cameran et al. (2016) use 




firm) to rotation years where the audit firm and partner change (76 observations). Partner 
rotations within the same firm are associated with significantly lower mean absolute and 
signed accruals (AAWCA and AWCA, respectively). The mean of the signed DD measure is 
also lower for partner rotations within the same firm. Firm rotations are associated with 
negative mean and median returns, while partner rotations are associated with positive mean 
and median returns. The differences in RET are statistically significant. 
[Insert Table 1 here] 
Table 2 presents the pairwise Pearson correlation coefficients below the diagonal and 
Spearman above the diagonal. Overall, most correlation coefficients are either insignificant, 
or have a low significance. However, PMROT is negatively and significantly associated with 
all measures of discretionary accruals, in contrast to FMROT which is insignificant, except in 
the case of ARESREV. PMROT and FMROT are highly correlated, owing to the fact that firm 
rotations is a subset of PMROT.21  
[Insert Table 2 here] 
4.2. Regression results 
4.2.1. Accounting-based measures of audit quality 
Table 3 reports the coefficients of Equation (5) for each of our measures of discretionary 
earnings and standard errors in parentheses. In column (1) the dependent variable is AAWCA, 
column (2) ADD and column (3) ARESREV. The last column reports the results of Equation 
(6).  
We find partner rotation (PMROT) is associated with improved audit quality across  the 
two measures of discretionary accruals and the measure of discretionary revenues. 
Specifically, the coefficient on PMROT in columns (1), (2) and (3) is negative and significant 
at the one percent or five percent level. In contrast, the coefficient on FMROT in all columns 
 
21 We run the VIF test in our regressions and results show no sign of multicollinearity issues (maximum VIF 




(1 to 3) is positive, but only significant at the five percent level in column (1). The economic 
effect is also substantial. Partner rotation is associated with a 36% reduction of the mean of 
AAWCA. For ADD and ARESREV the reduction is equal to 26% of their means. As to the 
controls, SIZE is positively and significantly related to ADD and GROWTH is negatively 
related to AAWCA with modest significance. The other controls are largely insignificant, but 
this is likely attributable to the use of firm fixed effects which reduces the variability of the 
independent variables.22 23 
[Insert Table 3 here] 
4.2.2. Earnings informativeness 
Column (4) in Table 3 provides the evidence on earnings informativeness around rotation 
years, as per Equation (6). Recall the coefficients of interest - the interaction between ROA 
and the rotation variables. The coefficient on PMROT*ROA is positive and significant at the 
one percent level, suggesting that partner rotations are associated with improved earnings 
informativeness, as perceived by the market. The coefficient of 2.578 suggests that one 
standard deviation in PMROT*ROA is associated with an increase of 6% in annual return. In 
contrast, the coefficient on FMROT*ROA is negative, and significant at the one percent level, 
indicating the market perception of the effect of firm rotations on audit quality is not 
incrementally favourable. Specifically, one standard deviation in FMROT*ROA is associated 
with a decrease of 6% in annual return. 
With respect to the control variables the evidence supports the positive association 
between returns and firm age, firm size and leverage. Additionally, earnings informativeness 
is positively related to operating cash flows and auditor size. 
4.2.3. Comparing rotation year to the preceding year 
 
22Most of the controls in Cameran et al. (2015) in their analysis of AAWCA are also insignificant, as they also 
use firm fixed effects.   
23The following variables lose significance in one or more specifications once we include firm fixed effects 




The main analyses pool together rotation years with all non-rotation years and uses the 
latter as the reference point. A concern regarding this specification is that the results may be 
attributed not to the effect of rotations per-se, but potentially to other differences in the cross-
section we do not control for. We therefore analyse a subsample of firm-years excluding non-
rotation years.24 In other words, for each firm that has experienced a mandatory rotation 
(either at the audit firm level or partner level) we have two observations.While the aim is to 
form a balanced panel for the year preceding and year that immediately follows rotations, we 
are constrained by the fact that we do not have observations prior to 2006, as we exclude 
observations that relate to the pre-period.   
The results of this analysis are presented in Table 4, which is structured in a similar 
fashion to Table 3. The coefficient on PMROT is negative and significant at the five percent 
(column 1) and ten percent (columns 2&3). The reduction in the measures of AQ owing to 
mandatory partner rotations is equivalent to 33% reduction of the mean of AAWCA. The 
comparable figures for ARESREV and ADD are 27% and 29%, respectively.  In contrast, the 
coefficient on FMROT in columns (1)-(3) is insignificant. This suggests that mandatory firm 
rotation does not have a discernible effect on audit quality in the first year. Column (4) 
indicates that the ERC is similar in the year preceding and the year of rotation, regardless of 
the rotation type. Nevertheless, returns are on average lower in a firm rotation year 
(coefficient = -0.283 and significant at the one percent level). 
[Insert Table 4 here] 
4.2.4. Firm rotation under single rotation regime 
Our results so far suggest audit firm rotation does not improve audit quality. One potential 
explanation is that, while partner rotations improve audit quality, firm rotations involve an 
 
24This analysis focuses on the immediate effects of firm and partner rotations relative to the previous year, and 
so cannot speak about longer-term effects of rotations. Note that, like Cameran et al. (2016) (in the case of 
mandatory firm rotations), this specification holds fixed the client firm. However, unlike Cameran et al. (2016), 




incremental adverse effect perhaps owing to loss of client-specific knowledge and other set-
up costs. Since audit firm rotation involves partner rotation, the finding of no relation 
between firm rotations and audit quality suggests that the two effects cancel each other out. 
With these insights in mind, we explore the period prior to the requirement to rotate audit 
partners e.g., before 2006, when in Italy only firm rotation was mandatory. The aim is to 
assess whether the no effect we have documented from 2006 onwards is unique to the dual 
rotation regime period, or more general in nature. Specifically, we examine the 1993-200425 
period, which features 63 mandatory firm rotations. The sample consists of 860 observations 
and Panel A of Table 5 describes this sample. Comparing this sample to the 2006-2012 
sample we note they are similar. For example, firm rotation rate in the early period is 7.3% 
while in the later period is 6.9%. Nonetheless some differences are noteworthy. RET and 
ROA in the early period are positive, on average, but negative in the 2006-2012 period. Firm 
size seems larger in the early period and growth rates lower.   
Panel B of Table 5 presents the results of this analysis. We find no relation between 
mandatory firm rotation and audit quality (columns (1)-(3)).26 This is broadly consistent with 
the findings reported in Table 3 for 2006-2012 for the audit quality measures. There is also 
no evidence that earnings informativeness is affected by mandatory firm rotations (column 
(4)). While these findings do not indicate that mandatory firm rotations in 1993-2004 
improved audit quality, or earnings informativeness, this may reflect that audit quality and 
earnings informativeness are sufficiently high prior to the rotation.  
[Insert Table 5 here] 
We further explore the possibility that the effect of firm rotation differs between the 
two rotation regimes. To do so we combine the two periods to a single sample of 1,960 
observations during 1993-2012. The descriptive statistics of this sample are reported in Panel 
 
25We excluded year 2005 as this was the first year in which IFRS were introduced for listed companies in Italy. 




A of Table 6. Broadly speaking, the descriptives for 1993-2012 are similar to the two sub-
periods we have examined above. We re-run Equations (5) and (6), as before, but now 
allowing the coefficient of FMROT to vary between the two periods. We do so by adding an 
interaction term FMROT*POST06, where POST06 is equal to 1 in 2006-2012 and zero 
otherwise. We also allow a different intercept for the two periods by adding POST06 to the 
models. The results of these analyses are reported in Panel B of Table 6. For AAWCA, the 
coefficient on FMORT is negative and significant at 5% or better. This suggests that AAWCA 
was negatively related to mandatory firm rotation up to 2004. However, the interaction term 
FMROT*POST06 is positive and marginally significant at the ten percent level, suggesting 
that firm rotations in 2006-2012 have a countervailing effect on AAWCA than before. The 
sum of the two coefficients, representing the overall relation between AAWCA and mandatory 
firm rotation in 2006-2012, is 0.010 and is insignificant. As for the other measures of audit 
quality we do not find that either in the early period or the later period firm rotations are 
associated with improved audit quality. We therefore conclude that there is little evidence of 
improved audit quality associated with mandatory firm rotations. 
Regarding price informativeness, as is seen from the coefficient on 
FMROT*POST06*ROA in column (4) of Panel B, there is no evidence that the information 
effect of firm rotation varies significantly between the two periods. Moreover, in the early 
period there is no information effect, consistent with Table 5. As for the 2006-2012 the sum 
of the coefficients FMROT*ROA + FMROT*POST06*ROA is -0.701 and is statistically 
insignificant.   
5. Additional analyses 
We run several robustness tests to affirm the nature of our findings. First, it is possible that 
when client firms rotate their auditors, changes to other corporate governance mechanisms 




duality, board size and percentage of independent directors. The results from this analysis 
remain qualitatively unchanged (untabulated).  
Second, we repeat our analyses excluding cases where audit firm rotations include a 
change of auditor type (i.e. between the group of Big and non-Big audit firms) to assess 
whether these changes drive the results. We find that these cases are quite rare: 18 switches in 
total. Our results are not sensitive to this specification (untabulated). 
Third, in the main analyses we exclude firm-years with voluntary partner or firm 
rotations, as these rotations may be motivated by a breakdown in auditor-client relationship, 
owing for example, to financial distress. We examine the sensitivity of our results to the 
inclusion, or exclusion of these observations. We re-estimate Tables 3, 5 and 6 in two ways. 
First by including voluntary rotation years, and adding voluntary rotation indicator variables, 
and second by excluding ALL client-firm-year observations, if a voluntary rotation takes 
place at any time during the period. The second approach is very conservative as it removes 
many useful observations, but at the same time controls for unobserved factors that may be 
associated with a voluntary rotation either prior to or following the rotation. As we report in 
the online appendix,27 we find our inferences are largely unaffected. 
Fourth, we acknowledge the possibility the effects of mandatory firm rotations are 
detectable beyond the first year, maybe due to auditor learning effects documented in the 
prior literature (e.g., Myers et al., 2003); or that auditor incentives may be influenced by an 
imminent rotation e.g. incentives to reduce the embarrassment effect after rotation. To 
investigate these possibilities we re-run Tables, 3, 5 & 6 dropping rotation firm years and 
replacing them with an indicator variable for the preceding year and an indicator variable for 
the following year; or alternatively expanding the window to include two years preceding and 
two years following a mandatory rotation. Overall, we find our inferences regarding the 
 




effects of mandatory firm rotations after 2006 do not change (see online appendix). However, 
we find some accruals-based evidence that audit quality improves in the year prior to 
mandatory firm rotation in 1993-2005.  
Fifth, in our main analyses we use absolute measures of abnormal accruals. This could 
potentially mask rotation effects on aggressive vs. conservative reporting. To examine this 
issue we rerun Tables 3, 5 & 6 using signed measures (see online appendix). In 2006-2012 
we find evidence suggesting partner rotations reduce extreme reporting in both directions. In 
1993-2005 we find firm rotations reduce earnings inflation, but that this effect is reversed in 
2006-2012.  
Sixth, Aobdia (2019) finds that reporting small profits (SPOS) is highly correlated with 
audit deficiencies detected by the PCAOB. Accordingly, we run logit regressions to assess if 
mandatory rotations are associated with the incidence of SPOS, where SPOS takes the value 
of one if ROA is between 0% to 3% and zero otherwise. As reported in the online appendix, 
in 2006-2012 we find that mandatory partner rotations are negatively related to the likelihood 
of SPOS (p-value = 10%), while firm rotations are unrelated to SPOS. This is consistent with 
the accruals-based measures results reported in Table 3. When we compare the year before 
and year after rotations in 2006-2012, we find results consistent with Table 4. Examining 
1993-2004, when only firm rotation was required, we find that firm rotations are unrelated to 
SPOS consistent with Table 5. 
Seventh, we follow Chen et al.’s (2018) advice and rerun the one-step models for the 
Dechow & Dichev (2002) model and the McNichols and Stubben (2008) model (see online 
appendix). Overall, the results and inferences are largely consistent with Tables 3-5 above 




Lastly, we repeat our analyses using the smaller sample for which we have data for all 
our variables (i.e. 703 observations for the post-2006 period); our results remain qualitatively 
similar using this panel. 
6. Conclusion 
Overall our findings suggest, in a dual mandatory audit rotation regime, the market perceives 
partner rotations as enhancing earnings informativeness and improving accounting quality. 
However, firm rotation does not improve either informativeness or accounting quality. 
Collectively, these findings could support the decision by US regulators not to require audit 
firm rotations, and the EU Regulation to allow long firm tenure. However, we cannot rule out 
the possibility that the observed partner rotation benefits may be preconditioned on the 
subsequently audit firm rotation. If this is true, the US regulators’ decision not to rotate firms 
may reduce the benefits arising from the audit partner rotation requirement.   
In assessing this paper’s results further two observations are in order. First, we study a 
specific regime in which firm tenure is restricted to nine years and partner tenure is limited to 
six years. Other countries have adopted a different set of limits to partner and firm tenure and 
the combined effect may differ from what is documented here. Second, institutional settings 
vary across audit and capital markets (La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, & Vishny, 1998; 
Spamann, 2010). To the extent that audit quality is influenced by these features, our results 
do not generalize to countries with stronger or weaker institutions. This caveat 
notwithstanding, Leuz (2010) finds Italy has similar regulatory and market attributes 
consistent with 21 other countries (see also La Porta et al. (1998) and Wingate (1997)). 
Therefore, our findings may be of relevance for a significant number of countries that share 
similar characteristics with Italy. However, we call on future research to explore the effects of 
a dual mandatory rotation regime in countries with similar, or dissimilar, regulatory 
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Absolute value of abnormal working capital accruals (AWCA) (DeFond and Park, 2001) 
scaled by total assets which is determined as a function of working capital (WC) and current 
and lagged sales (S): 




Working capital (WC) is defined as current assets (Compustat mnemonic ac) excluding cash 
(ch) and short-term investment (ivstsf ) minus current liabilities (lct) excluding short-term 
debt (dlcfs). The mnemonic for S is revt and for total asset is at.  
ADD 
The absolute value the  residual from  Dechow  and  Dichev’s model  (2002),  as  modified  
by  McNichols  (2002):  
                      CAi,t = α + β1CFOi,t-1 + β2CFOi,t +  β3CFOi,t+1 + β4ΔRev i,t+  β5PPEi,t+ εi,t             
Where, CA = is net income before extraordinary items (ib) plus depreciation and amortization 
minus (dp) operating cash flows (oancf), scaled by beginning of year total assets (at). 
Compustat mnemonics are: CFO - oancf and PPE – ppegt. DD is the signed residual. 
ARESREV 
Absolute discretionary revenues (McNichols and Stubben, 2008; Stubben, 2010; Chen et al., 
2011), which is the absolute value of the residual from a model that relates the change in 
accounts receivables to the change in revenues: 
                      ΔARi,t = α + βΔRevi,t + εi,t                   
where ΔARi,t is annual change in accounts receivable (mnemonic rect) and ΔRevi,t is the 
annual change in revenues, each scaled by beginning total assets. RESREV is the signed 
residual. 
RET Firm’s stock return over the fiscal year.  
VARIABLES of INTEREST 
(Audit partner and audit firm data were hand-collected from the audit report.) 
PMROTt 
An indicator dummy (ID) = 1 if there has been a mandatory partner rotation, inclusive of a 
change in partner as a result of an audit firm change in year t, 0 otherwise.  
FMROTt ID = 1, if there has been a mandatory firm rotation in year t, 0 otherwise.  
CONTROL VARIABLES 
AGE Number of years passed since the client’s IPO. Source: the Italian Stock Exchange Website. 
BIG ID = 1 if the audit firm is a Big-4 audit firm (E&Y, PWC, KPMG, Deloitte), 0 otherwise.  
SIZE Natural logarithm of total sales. 
LOSS ID = 1 if net income is negative in prior year, 0 otherwise (in). 
LEV Long term Debt (dltt) + Debt in current liabilities (dlc) divided by total assets (at).  
GROWTH Change in sales between period t and t-1, divided by sales in year t-1. 
ROA Return on Assets, measured as Income Before Extraordinary Items (ib) over total assets (at). 
CFO Operating cash flows (oancf) in year t scaled by beginning total assets  
 




Table 1: Sample of Italian Firms between 2006-2012 
Panel A: Descriptive statistics 
 N Mean SD Q1 Median Q3 
Dependent Variables 
AAWCA 1,100 0.101 0.198 0.016 0.042 0.093 
ADD 912 0.038 0.041 0.001 0.025 0.051 
ARESREV 1,100 0.049 0.072 0.011 0.028 0.056 
AWCA 1,100 -0.006 0.239 -0.051 -0.004 0.046 
DD 912 0.003 0.059 -0.022 0.004 0.028 
RESREV 1,100 -0.002 0.086 -0.033 -0.005 0.020 
RET 703 -0.035 0.539 -0.350 -0.082 0.147 
Variables of Interest 
PMROTt 1,100 0.136 0.343 0.000 0.000 0.000 
FMROTt 1,100 0.069 0.254 0.000 0.000 0.000 
PMROT*ROA 703 0.002 0.025 0.000 0.000 0.000 
FMROT*ROA 703 0.001 0.017 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Control Variables 
AGE 1,100 16.973 25.938 6.000 10.000 15.500 
BIG 1,100 0.864 0.343 1.000 1.000 1.000 
SIZE 1,100 6.581 3.257 4.538 5.634 7.514 
LOSS 1,100 0.175 0.381 0.000 0.000 0.000 
LEV 1,100 0.265 0.163 0.134 0.269 0.374 
GROWTH 1,100 0.088 0.487 -0.050 0.052 0.172 
ROA 1,100 -0.003 0.096 -0.018 0.015 0.041 
CFO 1,100 0.048 0.080 0.006 0.049 0.091 
All variables are defined in Appendix 1. 
 
Panel B: Number and type of rotations by year 
Year PMROT (#) FMROT (#) 
2006 40 2 
2007 15 9 
2008 31 23 
2009 11 5 
2010 17 13 
2011 14 7 
2012 22 17 











Panel C: Mandatory partner rotation year vs. mandatory firm rotation year in 2006-2012 
 
 
Partner Rotation without 
Firm Rotation 
Mandatory Firm Rotation Difference 
 
N Mean Median N Mean Median Mean  Median  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (2)-(5) (3)-(6) 
Dependent Variables:       
AAWCA 74 0.060 0.033 76 0.099 0.042 -0.038*  -0.009  
ADD 69 0.028 0.020 56 0.029 0.018 -0.001 0.002  
ARESREV 74 0.037 0.020 76 0.031 0.021 0.006 -0.001 
AWCA 74 0.011 0.033 76 0.034 0.042 -0.023** -0.009  
DD 69 -0.005 0.020 56 0.005 0.018 -0.010* 0.002  
RESREV 74 0.000 0.020 76 -0.001 0.021 0.001 -0.001  
RET 59 0.056 0.050 47 -0.240 -0.269 0.296*** 0.319*** 
Independent Variables:       
AGE 74 17.216 9.000 76 20.231 12.000 -3.021 -3.000*** 
BIG 74 0.932 1.000 76 0.901 1.000 0.025 0.000 
SIZE 74 7.511 6.347 76 7.780 6.779 0.270 -0.432 
LOSS 74 0.135 0.000 76 0.145 0.000 -0.010 0.000 
LEV 74 0.272 0.263 76 0.306 0.301 -0.330* -0.038 
GROWTH 74 -0.013 0.040 76 -0.019 0.028 0.007 0.012 
ROA 74 0.011 0.021 76 -0.004 0.014 0.015 0.007 
CFO 74 0.044 0.047 76 0.062 0.060 -0.018* -0.013 
Variable definitions: see Appendix 1. Differences in means are tested using t-tests and differences in medians are performed 






Table 2 - Correlations 
 
 
  FMROT PMROT AAWCA ADD ARESREV RET AGE BIG SIZE LOSS LEV GROWTH ROA CFO 
FMROT  0.795 -0.023 -0.026 -0.036 -0.042 0.129 0.008 0.076 -0.013 0.036 -0.031 -0.003 0.038 
PMROT 0.830  -0.054 -0.060 -0.065 -0.016 0.132 0.023 0.072 -0.018 0.037 -0.026 -0.004 -0.026 
AAWCA -0.027 -0.045  0.360 0.264 -0.006 -0.027 -0.032 -0.186 0.076 -0.044 0.009 -0.181 -0.018 
ADD -0.039 -0.077 0.318  0.346 -0.056 -0.116 -0.080 -0.076 -0.076 '0.070 0.006 -0.073 -0.135 
ARESREV -0.040 -0.056 0.201 0.343  0.008 -0.117 -0.039 -0.083 0.039 0.031 0.032 -0.109 -0.119 
RET -0.040 -0.032 -0.009 -0.045 -0.010  0.063 0.069 0.114 -0.105 -0.031 0.051 0.307 0.231 
AGE 0.060 0.048 0.111 0.049 0.010 0.033  -0.064 0.214 -0.010 -0.017 -0.119 -0.064 0.018 
BIG 0.011 0.021 -0.017 -0.081 -0.018 0.046 0.033  0.246 -0.116 0.028 0.039 -0.128 -0.099 
SIZE 0.064 0.005 -0.016 -0.037 -0.022 0.092 0.117 -0.171  -0.289 0.065 0.154 0.194 0.183 
LOSS -0.009 -0.010 0.097 0.069 0.031 -0.091 0.033 0.091 -0.028  0.198 -0.106 -0.280 -0.129 
LEV 0.034 0.035 -0.044 0.004 0.019 -0.001 0.013 0.026 0.009 0.185  -0.056 -0.175 -0.055 
GROWTH -0.019 -0.024 0.017 0.023 0.028 -0.020 -0.041 -0.001 0.119 -0.015 -0.034  0.133 0.091 
ROA -0.003 0.005 0.005 -0.152 -0.244 0.218 -0.057 -0.087 0.155 -0.237 -0.099 0.014  0.513 
CFO 0.022 0.007 0.007 -0.161 -0.202 0.135 -0.057 -0.078 0.146 -0.144 -0.059 0.011 0.464  
 
The table reports Pearson correlation coefficients below the diagonal and Spearman correlation above the diagonal. Variable definitions are reported in Appendix 1. Bold face 















Table 3: Mandatory rotation and reporting quality (2006-2012) 
AQ = α0+ α1 PMROT + α2FMROT + α3AGE + α4BIG + α5SIZE + α6LOSS + α7LEV + α8GROWTH + α9ROA + α10CFO + 
Year F.E. + Firm F.E. + ε;            (Eq. 5) 
RET = α0 + α1PMROT + α2FMROT + α3AGE + α4BIG + α5SIZE + α6LOSS + α7LEV + α8GROWTH + α9ROA + α10CFO  +  
α11PMROT*ROA  +  α12FMROT*ROA  +  α13AGE*ROA  +  α14BIG*ROA  +  α15SIZE*ROA  +  α16LOSS*ROA  +  
α17LEV*ROA  +α18GROWTH*ROA + α19CFO*ROA + Year F.E. + Firm F.E. + ε.     (Eq. 6) 
 
 Dependent Variable 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 AAWCA ADD ARESREV RET 
PMROT -0.036*** -0.010** -0.013** -0.076 
 (0.013) (0.004) (0.006) (0.061) 
FMROT 0.053** 0.004 0.010 0.038 
 (0.023) (0.006) (0.007) (0.080) 
AGE -0.022 -0.011 -0.004 0.234** 
 (0.022) (0.009) (0.008) (0.103) 
BIG -0.022 0.011 -0.022 0.074 
 (0.053) (0.015) (0.021) (0.125) 
SIZE -0.000 0.002** 0.000 0.023** 
 (0.003) (0.007) (0.001) (0.010) 
LOSS 0.017 0.000 0.001 -0.053 
 (0.022) (0.005) (0.006) (0.057) 
LEV 0.015 -0.011 0.004 0.420* 
 (0.057) (0.016) (0.020) (0.229) 
GROWTH -0.020* -0.005 -0.007 -0.041 
 (0.011) (0.004) (0.005) (0.038) 
ROA 0.044 0.008 -0.001 -0.426 
 (0.133) (0.033) (0.030) (1.201) 
CFO 0.057 -0.028 0.090 0.353 
 (0.101) (0.036) (0.060) (0.447) 
PMROT*ROA    2.578*** 
    (0.671) 
FMROT*ROA    -3.595*** 
    (1.042) 
AGE*ROA    -0.027 
    (0.017) 
BIG*ROA    2.227* 
    (1.181) 
SIZE*ROA    -0.017 
    (0.132) 
LOSS*ROA    0.200 
    (0.845) 
LEV*ROA    1.342 
    (0.229) 
GRWTH*ROA    0.103 
    (0.510) 
CFO*ROA    8.200* 
    (4.529) 
Intercept  0.382 0.194 0.117 -3.594** 
 (0.326) (0.124) (0.117) (1.531) 
Observations 1,100 912 1,100 703 
Year F.E. Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm F.E. Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R-Squared (within) 0.054 0.033 0.034 0.345 
This table reports the OLS estimates from Eq. (5) in columns 1-3, where the dependent variable is either AAWCA, ADD, and ARESREV 
and Eq. (6) in column 4. Variables of interest are: PMROT, equals one if either the audit partner or the audit firm rotates, zero 
otherwise; FMROT, equals one when the audit firm rotates, zero otherwise. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors are clustered by 
firm and reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** represent significance level of 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively (two-tailed). All 





Table 4: Mandatory rotation and reporting quality - rotation vs. preceding year (2006-2012) 
AQ = α0 + α1 PMROT + α2FMROT + α3AGE + α4BIG + α5SIZE + α6LOSS + α7LEV + α8GROWTH + α9ROA + α10CFO + Year 
F.E. + IND + ε    (Eq.5) 
 
RET = α0 + α1PMROT + α2FMROT + α3AGE + α4BIG + α5SIZE + α6LOSS+ α7LEV + α8GROWTH + α9ROA + α10CFO + 
α11PMROT*ROA + α12FMROT*ROA + α13AGE*ROA + α14BIG*ROA + α15SIZE*ROA + α16LOSS*ROA+ α17LEV*ROA + 
α18GROWTH*ROA + α19CFO*ROA + Year F.E. + IND. + ε. .     (Eq. 6) 
 
 
This table reports the OLS estimates from Eq. (5) in columns 1-3, where the dependent variable is either AAWCA, ADD, and ARESREV 
and Eq. (6) in column 4. Variables of interest are: PMROT, equals one if either the audit partner or audit firm rotates, zero otherwise; 
FMROT, equals one when the audit firm rotates,  zero otherwise. The sample excludes years other than the rotation year and the 
preceding year. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors are clustered by firm and reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** represent 
Dependent Variable 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 AAWCA ADD ARESREV RET 
PMROT -0.028** -0.010* -0.012* -0.043 
 (0.130) (0.005) (0.007) (0.086) 
FMROT 0.039 0.003 -0.005 -0.283*** 
 (0.026) (0.006) (0.009) (0.087) 
AGE 0.002** -0.000 -0.000** -0.002 
 (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) 
BIG 0.005 -0.006 -0.028 -0.161 
 (0.029) (0.008) (0.024) (0.157) 
SIZE -0.003 -0.000 0.001 0.018 
 (0.003) (0.001) (0.010) (0.011) 
LOSS 0.017 0.004 0.012 -0.138 
 (0.026) (0.009) (0.021) (0.094) 
LEV 0.058 -0.008 0.017 0.068 
 (0.064) (0.013) (0.028) (0.247) 
GROWTH 0.003 0.006** 0.001 -0.036 
 (0.013) (0.003) (0.007) (0.062) 
ROA -0.297** -0.057* -0.001 0.291 
 (0.117) (0.003) (0.050) (1.851) 
CFO -0.182 0.066 0.007 0.191 
 (0.137) (0.055) (0.122) (0.775) 
PMROT*ROA    0.743 
    (1.120) 
FMROT*ROA    -0.145 
    (1.157) 
AGE*ROA    -0.004 
    (0.016) 
BIG*ROA    0.984 
    (1.381) 
SIZE*ROA    -0.039 
    (0.154) 
LOSS*ROA    -0.138 
    (0.979) 
LEV*ROA    0.667 
    (3.418) 
GRWTH*ROA    -0.036 
    (0.062) 
CFO*ROA    6.507 
    (6.967) 
Intercept 0.020 0.033*** 0.027** 0.067 
 (0.034) (0.008) (0.012) (0.158) 
Observations 297 270 297 223 
Industry Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 




significance level of 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively (two-tailed). All continuous variables are winzorised at 1%. All variable 





Table 5: Mandatory audit firm rotation and reporting quality during single rotation regime 
(1993-2004) 
Panel A: Descriptive Statistics 
 N Mean SD Q1 Median Q3 
Dependent Variables 
AAWCA 860 0.109 0.201 0.021 0.049 0.098 
ADD 694 0.058 0.059 0.017 0.038 0.078 
ARESREV 860 0.074 0.141 0.014 0.037 0.078 
RET 766 0.053 0.493 -0.243 -0.005 0.241 
Variables of Interest  
FMROT 860 0.073 0.261 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Control Variables  
AGE 860 16.151 25.938 3.000 6.000 15.500 
BIG 860 0.936 0.245 1.000 1.000 1.000 
SIZE 860 8.143 3.909 4.066 6.944 11.964 
LOSS 860 0.123 0.329 0.000 0.000 0.000 
LEV 860 0.257 0.156 0.133 0.265 0.356 
GROWTH 860 0.009 0.453 -0.085 0.034 0.153 
ROA 860 0.004 0.091 -0.003 0.021 0.046 




Panel B: Regression analysis of firm rotations (FMROT) 
AQ = α0 + α1 PMROT + α2FMROT + α3AGE + α4BIG + α5SIZE + α6LOSS + α7LEV + α8GROWTH + α9ROA + 
α10CFO + Year F.E. + Firm F.E. + ε    (Eq.5) 
 
RET = α0 + α1PMROT + α2FMROT + α3AGE + α4BIG + α5SIZE + α6LOSS+ α7LEV + α8GROWTH + α9ROA + α10CFO 
+ α11PMROT*ROA + α12FMROT*ROA + α13AGE*ROA + α14BIG*ROA + α15SIZE*ROA + α16LOSS*ROA+ 
α17LEV*ROA + α18GROWTH*ROA + α19CFO*ROA + Year F.E. + Firm F.E. + ε. .     (Eq. 6) 
 
 
 Dependent Variable 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 AAWCA ADD ARESREV RET 
FMROT -0.010 -0.009 -0.010 0.034 
 (0.013) (0.006) (0.112) (0.078) 
AGE 0.000 0.002 0.000 -0.015*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.004) 
BIG 0.046 -0.020* 0.027 -0.230* 
 (0.055) (0.012) (0.019) (0.140) 
SIZE 0.001 -0.001 -0.000 -0.010 
 (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.006) 
LOSS -0.009 -0.006 0.005 -0.090* 
 (0.024) (0.008) (0.027) (0.053) 
LEV 0.108* -0.040 0.065 -0.027 
 (0.062) (0.026) (0.040) (0.161) 
GROWTH -0.004 0.007 -0.006 -0.007 
 (0.016) (0.006) (0.021) (0.037) 
ROA -0.097 -0.002 0.133 0.647 
 (0.143) (0.080) (0.140) (0.693) 
CFO -0.136 -0.102*** -0.136 0.156 
 (0.105) (0.034) (0.162) (0.225) 
FMROT*ROA    -1.150 
    (0.930) 
AGE*ROA    0.001 
    (0.008) 
BIG*ROA    0.676 
    (1.638) 
SIZE*ROA    0.153** 
    (0.067) 
LOSS*ROA    0.296 
    (0.792) 
LEV*ROA    -2.902 
    (2.467) 
GRWTH*ROA    -0.614 
    (0.426) 
CFO*ROA    0.247 
    (1.308) 
Intercept 0.130*** 0.047*** 0.062 0.142 
 (0.033) (0.015) (0.004) (0.131) 
Observations 860 694 860 766 
Year F.E. Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm F.E. Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R-squared (within) 0.046 0.184 0.060 0.190 
This table reports the OLS estimates, from Eq.(5) in columns 1-3, where the dependent variable is either AAWCA, ADD, and 
ARESREV and Eq. (6) in column 4. The sample is based on the pre-dual rotation regime 1993-2004 thus PMROT is excluded. 
Variables of interest is FMROT, equals one when the audit firm rotates,  zero otherwise. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors 
are clustered by firm and reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** represent significance level of 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively 






Mandatory audit firm rotations and reporting quality pre and post dual audit rotation 
regime (1993 – 2012) 
Panel A: Descriptive Statistics 
 N Mean SD Q1 Median Q3 
Dependent Variables 
AAWCA 1,960 0.107 0.202 0.018 0.046 0.097 
ADD 1,606 0.047 0.051 0.013 0.030 0.062 
ARESREV 1,960 0.061 0.110 0.012 0.032 0.068 
RET 1,469 0.009 0.522 -0.297 -0.054 0.196 
Variable of Interest 
FMROT 1,960 0.074 0.261 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Control Variables 
AGE 1,960 16.589 25.989 4.000 9.000 15.000 
BIG 1,960 0.894 0.308 1.000 1.000 1.000 
SIZE 1,960 7.257 3.640 4.703 6.054 8.967 
LOSS 1,960 0.153 0.360 0.000 0.000 0.000 
LEV 1,960 0.261 0.161 0.132 0.267 0.367 
GROWTH 1,960 0.057 0.478 -0.066 0.044 0.164 
ROA 1,960 -0.000 0.095 -0.012 0.018 0.043 







PANEL B: Regression analysis 
AQ = α0 + α1FMROT+ α2FMROT *POST06+ α3POST06+ α4AGE + α5BIG + α6SIZE + α7LOSS + α8LEV + α9GROWTH + α10ROA 
+ α11CFO + Year F.E. + Firm F.E. + ε     
 
RET = α0 + α1FMROT+ α2FMROT *POST06+ α3POST06+ α4AGE + α5BIG + α6SIZE + α7LOSS+ α8LEV + α9GROWTH + α10ROA 
+ α11CFO + α12FMROT*ROA + α13FMROT*POST06*ROA + α14POST06*ROA +α15AGE*ROA + α16BIG*ROA + α17SIZE*ROA + 
α18LOSS*ROA+ α19LEV*ROA + α20GROWTH*ROA + α21CFO*ROA + Year F.E. + Firm F.E. + ε. .      
 
 
                 Dependent Variable 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 AAWCA ADD ARESREV RET 
FMROT -0.028** -0.008 -0.017* 0.024 
 (0.014) (0.005) (0.011) (0.070) 
FMROT*POST06 0.038* 0.008 0.007 -0.091 
 (0.021) (0.006) (0.012) (0.088) 
POST06 -0.037 -0.034 -0.037 -0.315* 
 (0.032) (0.043) (0.043) (0.184) 
AGE -0.001 0.002*** 0.002 0.025*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.003) 
BIG -0.011 0.012 -0.012 0.024 
 (0.033) (0.007) (0.009) (0.071) 
SIZE 0.000 0.001 0.001 -0.001 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.005) 
LOSS 0.007 0.002 0.002 -0.090** 
 (0.016) (0.004) (0.008) (0.044) 
LEV 0.016 -0.015 0.026 0.174 
 (0.052) (0.014) (0.020) (0.150) 
GROWTH -0.015* 0.000 -0.006 -0.067*** 
 (0.008) (0.003) (0.007) (0.025) 
ROA -0.229* -0.036 -0.018 0.899** 
 (0.018) (0.034) (0.045) (0.346) 
CFO -0.059 0.063** -0.126 0.276* 
 (0.083) (0.024) (0.102) (0.165) 
FMROT*ROA    -0.812 
    (0.534) 
POST06*ROA    -0.482 
    (0.352) 
FMROT*POST06*ROA    0.111 
    (0.840) 
AGE*ROA    -0.006 
    (0.005) 
BIG*ROA    0.455 
    (0.374) 
SIZE*ROA    0.079 
    (0.044) 
LOSS*ROA    -0.207 
    (0.302) 
LEV*ROA    -0.661 
    (0.771) 
GRWTH*ROA    -0.272 
    (0.307) 
CFO*ROA    1.249* 
    (0.591) 
Intercept 0.175*** 0.043*** 0.034 -0.283* 
 (0.032) (0.008) (0.030) (0.158) 




Year F.E. Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm F.E. Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R-squared (within) 0.031 0.129 0.048 0.223 
This table presents the regression results based on a sample from 1993 to 2012. FMROT equals one if the audit firm mandatorily rotated, zero 
otherwise. POST06 equals one if the year is between 2006 to 2012 and zero otherwise. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors are clustered by 
firm and reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** represent significance level of 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively (two-tailed). All continuous 
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Table 3 – Mandatory rotation and reporting quality with extension to earlier and later years  
(2006-2012) 
 Dependent Variable 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
In the paper AAWCA ADD ARESREV RET 
PMROT 
    -
0.036*** 
 -0.010**   -0.013** -0.076 
 (0.013) (0.004) (0.006) (0.061) 
FMROT    0.053** 0.004 0.010 0.038 
 (0.023) (0.006) (0.007) (0.080) 
ROA    -0.426 
    (1.201) 
PMROT*ROA       2.578*** 
    (0.671) 
FMROT*ROA      -3.595*** 
    (1.041) 
Dropping rotation years, and using indicators 
for the year before and the year after rotation 
AAWCA ADD ARESREV RET 
PMROT-1 0.005 -0.007 0.003 0.084 
 (0.015) (0.005) (0.008) (0.127) 
PMROT+1 -0.017 -0.004 0.001 -0.095 
 (0.028) (0.006) (0.009) (0.113) 
FMROT-1 0.012 0.013* 0.010 -0.117 
 (0.029) (0.007) (0.017) (0.159) 
FMROT+1 0.044 0.021* 0.027 -0.061 
 (0.037) (0.010) (0.027) (0.138) 
ROA    0.333 
    (1.571) 
PMROT-1*ROA    ‐0.639 
    (1.182) 
PMROT+1*ROA    0.829 
    (1.516) 
FMROT-1*ROA    2.345 
    (1.838) 
FMROT+1*ROA    ‐1.083 
    (2.637) 
Dropping rotation years, and using indicators  
for the two years before and the two years after  
rotation 
AAWCA ADD ARESREV RET 
PMROT-1&2 0.009 -0.003 0.002 -0.106 




PMROT+1&2 -0.013 0.002 0.005 -0.183 
 (0.020) (0.006) (0.008) (0.111) 
FMROT-1&2 0.031 0.004 0.003 0.039 
 (0.027) (0.008) (0.016) (0.131) 
FMROT+1&2 0.038 0.006 -0.041 0.153 
 (0.023) (0.007) (0.018) (0.147) 
ROA    -0.283 
    (1.450) 
PMROT-1&2*ROA    -0.275 
    (1.731) 
PMROT+1&2*ROA    3.324* 
    (1.818) 
FMROT-1&2*ROA    -1.411 
    (1.920) 
FMROT+1&2*ROA    -2.721 
    (2.572) 
Note: We report only the coefficients of interest, but the regression models include all control variables and 






Table 5 - Mandatory audit firm rotation and reporting quality during single rotation regime 
(1993-2005) 
 Dependent Variable 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
In the paper AAWCA ADD ARESREV RET 
FMROT -0.010 -0.009 -0.010 0.034 
 (0.013) (0.006) (0.012) (0.078) 
ROA    0.647 
    (0.693) 
FMROT*ROA    -1.150 
    (0.930) 
Dropping rotation years, and using 
indicators for the year before and the 
year after rotation 
AAWCA ADD ARESREV RET 
FMROT-1 -0.021* -0.005 -0.016 0.121 
 (0.012) (0.009) (0.013) (0.077) 
FMROT+1 -0.016 -0.006 -0.023 -0.013 
 (0.012) (0.009) (0.017) (0.052) 
ROA    -0.198 
    (0.768) 
FMROT-1*ROA    -0.962 
    (0.992) 
FMROT+1*ROA    0.037 
    (0.874) 
Dropping rotation years, and using 
indicators for the two years before and 
the two years after rotation 
AAWCA ADD ARESREV RET 
FMROT-1&2 -0.018 -0.004 -0.008   0.132** 
 (0.014) (0.007) (0.014) (0.064) 
FMROT+1&2 -0.009 0.001 -0.019 0.064 
 (0.018) (0.008) (0.017) (0.050) 
ROA    -0.377 
    (0.659) 
FMROT-1&2*ROA    -0.408 
    (0.837) 
FMROT+1&2*ROA    -0.923 
    (0.725) 
 Note: We report only the coefficients of interest, but the regression models include all control variables and 





Table 6 - Mandatory audit firm rotations and reporting quality pre- and post-dual audit rotation 
regime (1993 – 2012) 
 Dependent Variable 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
In the paper AAWCA ADD ARESREV RET 
FMROT     -0.028** -0.008 -0.017* 0.024 
 (0.014) (0.005) (0.011) (0.070) 
FMROT_POST06 0.038* 0.008 0.007 -0.091 
 (0.021) (0.006) (0.012) (0.089) 
POST06 -0.037 -0.034 -0.037 -0.315* 
 (0.032) (0.042) (0.043) (0.184) 
ROA    0.899** 
    (0.346) 
FMROT*ROA    -0.812 
    (0.534) 
POST06*ROA    -0.482 
    (0.352) 
FMROT*POST06*ROA    0.111 
    (0.840) 
Dropping rotation years, and using 
indicators for the year before and the 
 year after rotation 
AAWCA ADD ARESREV RET 
FMROT-1     -0.039*** -0.006  -0.024** 0.049 
 (0.013) (0.008) (0.011) (0.073) 
FMROT+1 -0.025** -0.012    -0.034*** -0.070 
 (0.012) (0.008) (0.013) (0.048) 
FMROT-1_POST06 0.055* 0.016 0.029 -0.137 
 (0.032) (0.010) (0.021) (0.108) 
FMROT+1_POST06 0.046   0.033***   0.066** -0.061 
 (0.031) (0.012) (0.033) (0.090) 
POST06 -0.037 -0.035* -0.050  -0.449** 
 (0.420) (0.019) (0.039) (0.226) 
ROA      0.855** 
    (0.432) 
FMROT-1*ROA    0.255 
    (0.887) 
FMROT+1*ROA    0.511 
    (0.724) 
POST06*ROA    -0.401 
    (0.406) 




    (1.410) 
FMROT+1*POST06*ROA    -2.075 
    (1.542) 
Dropping rotation years, and using 
indicators for two years before and two 
years after rotation 
AAWCA ADD ARESREV RET 
FMROT-1&2      -0.039*** -0.005 -0.012 0.075 
 (0.014) (0.006) (0.012) (0.075) 
FMROT+1&2  -0.029** -0.001 -0.011 -0.030 
 (0.014) (0.007) (0.012) (0.046) 
FMROT-1&2_POST06  0.049* 0.008 0.011   -0.167** 
 (0.026) (0.007) (0.016) (0.078) 
FMROT+1&2_POST06     0.045** 0.009 0.004 -0.039 
 (0.020) (0.009) (0.013) (0.094) 
POST06 -0.048 -0.017 -0.004 -0.354 
 (0.041) (0.044) (0.034) (0.222) 
ROA    0.700* 
     (0.392) 
FMROT-1&2*ROA    0.254 
    (0.650) 
FMROT+1&2*ROA    0.420 
    (0.559) 
POST06*ROA    -0.559 
    (0.404) 
FMROT-1&2*POST06*ROA    1.004 
    (1.155) 
FMROT+1&2*POST06*ROA    1.420 
    (1.417) 
 
Note: We report only the coefficients of interest, but the regression models include all control variables and 






Table 3 - Mandatory rotation and reporting quality: sensitivity analysis to the exclusion of all client 
firms experiencing a voluntary partner or firm rotation during 2006-2012, or alternatively, 
controlling for voluntary rotations 
 Dependent Variable 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
In the paper (where we exclude 
annual observations with voluntary 
rotations) 
AAWCA ADD ARESREV RET 
PMROT -0.036*** -0.010** -0.013** -0.076 
 (0.013) (0.004) (0.006) (0.061) 
FMROT 0.053** 0.004 0.010 0.038 
 (0.023) (0.006) (0.007) (0.080) 
ROA    -0.426 
    (1.201) 
PMROT*ROA    2.578*** 
    (0.671) 
FMROT*ROA    -3.595*** 
    (1.042) 
Controlling for voluntary rotation years AAWCA ADD ARESREV RET 
PMROT -0.035*** -0.010** -0.016** -0.084 
 (0.013) (0.004) (0.007) (0.064) 
FMROT 0.055** 0.005 0.014 0.016 
 (0.023) (0.006) (0.009) (0.080) 
ROA    0.312 
    (0.839) 
PMROT*ROA    2.240*** 
    (0.803) 
FMROT*ROA    -2.534** 
    (1.154) 
PVOL 0.016 0.001 -0.010 0.163 
 (0.015) (0.004) (0.006) (0.101) 
FVOL 0.027 0.009 0.037 0.096 
 (0.029) (0.009) (0.031) (0.102) 
Without voluntary rotating client-
firm- years 
AAWCA ADD ARESREV RET 
PMROT -0.016* -0.010* -0.005 -0.088 
 (0.009) (0.005) (0.006) (0.090) 
FMROT 0.014 0.008 0.009 0.091 
 (0.013) (0.007) (0.008) (0.112) 
ROA    -0.043 
    (0.256) 




    (1.165) 
FMROT*ROA    -2.736** 
    (1.277) 
 
Note: We report only the coefficients of interest, but the regression models include all control 






Table 5 - Mandatory rotation and reporting quality: sensitivity analysis to the exclusion of all client 
firms experiencing a voluntary partner or firm rotation during 1993-2005, or alternatively, 
controlling for voluntary rotations 
 
 Dependent Variable 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
In the paper (where we exclude 
annual observations with voluntary 
rotations): 
AAWCA ADD ARESREV RET 
FMROT -0.010 -0.009 -0.010 0.034 
 (0.013) (0.006) (0.012) (0.078) 
ROA    0.647 
    (0.693) 
FMROT*ROA    -1.150 
    (0.930) 
Controlling for voluntary rotation 
years 
AAWCA ADD ARESREV RET 
FMROT -0.011 -0.007 -0.013 0.023 
 (0.013) (0.006) (0.011) (0.072) 
ROA    1.076 
    (0.680) 
FMROT*ROA    -0.805 
    (0.615) 
PVOL -0.013 -0.004 -0.003 -0.018 
 (0.012) (0.006) (0.011) (0.050) 
FVOL 0.009 0.004 -0.018 0.018 
 (0.025) (0.012) (0.022) (0.094) 
Without voluntary rotating client-firm- 
years 
AAWCA ADD ARESREV RET 
FMROT -0.031 0.000 -0.013 0.005 
 (0.025) (0.017) (0.020) (0.139) 
ROA 0.392 0.262 -0.443 -0.950 
 (0.546) (0.159) (0.284) (1.263) 
FMROT*ROA    -0.813 
    (4.920) 
 
Note: We report only the coefficients of interest, but the regression models include all control 




Table 6 - Mandatory rotation and reporting quality: sensitivity analysis to the exclusion of all client 
firms experiencing a voluntary partner or firm rotation during 1993-2012, or alternatively, 
controlling for voluntary rotations 
 Dependent Variable 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
In the paper (where we exclude annual 
observations with voluntary rotations) 
AAWCA ADD ARESREV RET 
FMROT   -0.028** -0.008 -0.017* 0.024 
 (0.014) (0.005) (0.011) (0.070) 
FMROT*POST06  0.038* 0.008 0.007 -0.091 
 (0.021) (0.006) (0.012) (0.089) 
POST06 -0.037 -0.034 -0.037 -0.315* 
 (0.032) (0.042) (0.043) (0.184) 
ROA       0.899** 
    (0.346) 
FMROT*ROA    -0.812 
    (0.534) 
POST06*ROA    -0.482 
    (0.352) 
FMROT*POST06*ROA    0.111 
    (0.840) 
Controlling for voluntary rotation years AAWCA ADD ARESREV RET 
FMROT    -0.027** -0.008 -0.018* 0.033 
 (0.013) (0.006) (0.010) (0.070) 
FMROT*POST06     0.041** 0.009 0.010 -0.105 
 (0.020) (0.007) (0.012) (0.089) 
POST06 -0.036 -0.034 -0.037 -0.311* 
 (0.041) (0.041) (0.038) (0.175) 
ROA       0.869** 
    (0.349) 
FMROT*ROA    -0.829 
    (0.603) 
POST06*ROA    -0.467 
    (0.349) 
FMROT*POST06*ROA    0.214 
    (0.900) 
PVOL 0.011 -0.000 -0.009 0.083 
 (0.011) (0.004) (0.006) (0.053) 
FVOL 0.012 0.009 0.019 0.065 
 (0.021) (0.007) (0.021) (0.064) 
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Dropping voluntary rotating client-firm- 
years 
AAWCA ADD ARESREV RET 
FMROT -0.076* -0.015 -0.020** -0.064 
 (0.045) (0.016) (0.009) (0.127) 
FMROT_POST06 0.067 0.023 0.018 0.113 
 (0.043) (0.018) (0.015) (0.185) 
POST06 0.131      0.402*** -0.152 2.694 
 (0.547) (0.075) (0.249) (1.853) 
ROA -0.049 0.133 0.036 -0.048 
 (0.410) (0.084) (0.088) (2.267) 
FMROT*ROA    2.537 
    (4.983) 
POST06*ROA    1.589 
    (1.710) 
FMROT*POST06*ROA    -4.453 
    (5.287) 
Note: We report only the coefficients of interest, but the regression models include all control variables and 




Table A7: Firm FE but without clustering 
Panel A: Table 3 - Mandatory rotation and reporting quality 
 Dependent Variable 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 AAWCA ADD ARESREV RET 
PMROT     -0.036***  -0.010**   -0.013** -0.076 
 (0.013) (0.004) (0.006) (0.061) 
FMROT    0.053** 0.004 0.010 0.038 
 (0.023) (0.006) (0.007) (0.80) 
ROA    -0.426 
    (1.201) 
PMROT*ROA       2.578*** 
    (0.671) 
FMROT*ROA       -3.596*** 
    (1.042) 
Observations 1,100 912 1,100 703 
Year F.E. Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm F.E. Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R-squared (within) 0.038 0.033 0.034 0.345 
Adj_R-squared 0.455 0.267 0.326 0.254 
 
Panel B: Table 5 - Mandatory audit firm rotation and reporting quality during single rotation regime: 
1993-2005 
 Dependent Variable 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 AAWCA ADD ARESREV RET 
FMROT -0.010 -0.008 -0.010 0.034 
 (0.013) (0.006) (0.012) (0.078) 
ROA    0.347 
    (0.693) 
FMROT*ROA    -1.150 
    (0.930) 
Observations 860 694 860 766 
Year F.E. Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm F.E. Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R-squared (within) 0.046 0.184 0.060 0.190 




Panel C: Table 6 - Mandatory audit firm rotations and reporting quality pre- and post-audit rotation 
regime (1993 – 2012) 
 Dependent Variable 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 AAWCA ADD ARESREV RET 
FMROT   -0.027** -0.009* -0.018* 0.019 
 (0.013) (0.005) (0.011) (0.070) 
FMROT*POST06    0.041** 0.009 0.009 -0.095 
 (0.021) (0.006) (0.012) (0.088) 
POST06 -0.049 -0.016 -0.041 -0.330* 
 (0.032) (0.043) (0.043) (0.184) 
ROA    0.896** 
    (0.346) 
FMROT*ROA    -0.707 
    (0.534) 
POST06*ROA    -0.411 
    (0.352) 
FMROT*POST06*ROA    0.094 
    (0.840) 
Observations 1,960 1,594 1,960 1,662 
Year F.E. Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm F.E. Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R-squared (within) 0.037 0.147 0.058 0.231 
Adj_R-square 0.409 0.235 0.144 0.214 
Note: We report only the coefficients of interest, but the regression models include all control variables and 








Clustering by firm with industry fixed effects 
Panel A: Table 3 - Mandatory rotation and reporting quality 
 
 Dependent Variable 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 AAWCA ADD ARESREV RET 
PMROT  0.028**    -0.010**  -0.017** -0.064 
 (0.011) (0.004) (0.007) (0.052) 
FMROT 0.029 0.004 0.004 -0.021 
 (0.024) (0.006) (0.008) (0.067) 
ROA    0.902 
    (0.560) 
PMROT*ROA       1.587** 
    (0.665) 
FMROT*ROA      -1.909** 
    (0.767) 
Observations 1,100 912 1,100 703 
Year F.E. Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry F.E. Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R-squared (within) 0.172 0.105 0.049 0.296 
Adj_R-square 0.152 0.079 0.027 0.262 
  
Panel B: Table 5 - Mandatory audit firm rotation and reporting quality during single rotation 
regime (1993-2005) 
 
 Dependent Variable 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 AAWCA ADD ARESREV RET 
FMROT -0.029** -0.009* -0.019 0.042 
 (0.013) (0.005) (0.011) (0.078) 
ROA      0.734** 
    (0.341) 
FMROT*ROA    -0.900 
    (0.727) 
Observations 860 694 860 766 
Year F.E. Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm F.E. Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R-squared (within) 0.174 0.162 0.114 0.240 
Adj_R-square 0.146 0.128 0.084 0.203 
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 Dependent Variable 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 AAWCA ADD ARESREV RET 
FMROT    -0.038***  -0.010* -0.021* 0.012 
 (0.013) (0.005) (0.011) (0.067) 
FMROT*POST06 0.045* 0.005 0.009 -0.096 
 (0.025) (0.006) (0.012) (0.082) 
POST06 -0.038 0.014 -0.009 0.069 
 (0.043) (0.039) (0.021) (0.467) 
ROA         1.052*** 
    (0.243) 
FMROT*ROA    -0.349 
    (0.467) 
POST06*ROA    -0.290 
    (0.286) 
FMROT*POST06*ROA    -0.124 
    (0.654) 
Observations 1,960 1,594 1,960 1,662 
Year F.E. Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm F.E. Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R-squared (within) 0.141 0.157 0.085 0.239 
     
Note: We report only the coefficients of interest, but the regression models include all control 




Table A9 – Signed AQ measures 
Panel A: Table 3 - Mandatory rotation and reporting quality (2006-2012) 
 
 Dependent Variable 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
 AWCA POS_AWCA NEG_AWCA DD POS_DD NEG_DD RESREV POS_RESREV NEG_RESREV 
PMROT 0.037   -0.030**     -0.030***    -0.012** -0.009* -0.006 0.006 - 0.008  -0.022** 
 (0.028) (0.014) (0.011) (0.006) (0.005) (0.006) (0.010) (0.012) (0.008) 
FMROT 0.023     0.093** 0.010     0.019** 0.009 -0.005 0.003 -0.004 0.002 
 (0.037) (0.042) (0.022) (0.008) (0.008) (0.007) (0.011) (0.016) (0.009) 
 
Panel B: Table 5 - Regression analysis of firm rotations (1993-2005) 
 
 Dependent Variable 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
 AWCA POS_AWCA NEG_AWCA DD POS_DD NEG_DD RESREV POS_RESREV NEG_RESREV 
FMROT 0.012      -0.041*** -0.031 0.013    -0.011** 0.004 -0.005   -0.039** -0.009 
 (0.014) (0.015) (0.020) (0.009) (0.005) (0.011) (0.013) (0.015) (0.014) 
 





Panel C: Table 6 - Regression analysis of firm rotations 1993-2012 with interactions for the period 2005-2012 
 
 Dependent Variable 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
 AWCA POS_AWCA NEG_AWCA DD POS_DD NEG_DD RESREV POS_RESREV NEG_RESREV 
FMROT 0.015     -0.051*** -0.034* 0.013 -0.013** 0.006 -0.005     -0.047*** -0.009 
 (0.014) (0.017) (0.020) (0.009) (0.005) (0.010) (0.012) (0.017) (0.014) 
FMROT*POST06 0.035      0.124*** 0.016 -0.011 0.013* -0.016 0.009    0.039** -0.009 
 (0.029) (0.040) (0.029) (0.011) (0.008) (0.011) (0.013) (0.020) (0.015) 
POST06    -0.106** -0.066 -0.019 -0.029 -0.025*     0.066*** -0.032 -0.033 0.021 
 (0.053) (0.061) (0.050) (0.051) (0.015) (0.012) (0.024) (0.036) (0.021) 
 
Notes: The dependent variables NEG_AWCA, NEG_DD and NEG_ RESREV are the absolute value of AWCA < 0, DD < 0 and RESERV < 0, respectively. 




Table A10 – Replication of Cameran et al (2016) (1993-2004) 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 AAWCA AAWCA AWCA AWCA AAWCA AAWCA AWCA AWCA 
PERIOD2 -0.001 0.002 0.007 0.003     
 (0.011) (0.011) (0.022) (0.021)     
PERIOD3 -0.020* -0.019 -0.002 -0.004     
 (0.012) (0.013) (0.024) (0.023)     
FTEN     -0.003* -0.002 0.001 -0.001 
     (0.002) (0.002) (0.004) (0.004) 
PVOL  -0.138   0.056*  -0.012    0.056** 
  (0.016)  (0.029)  (0.016)  (0.029) 
FVOL  0.031  -0.046  0.027  -0.046 
  (0.024)  (0.044)  (0.024)  (0.045) 
AGE 0.000 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.000 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 
 (0.003) (0.004) (0.005) (0.008) (0.001) (0.004) (0.005) (0.007) 
SIZE 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.003 0.005 0.003 0.003 0.003 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) 
LOSS -0.005 -0.003    0.063** 0.038 -0.002 -0.002 0.039 0.039 
 (0.016) (0.017) (0.032) (0.031) (0.023) (0.017) (0.030) (0.031) 
LEV 0.081 0.081 -0.039 0.012 0.075 0.079 0.009 0.012 
 (0.050) (0.017) (0.099) (0.095) (0.060) (0.051) (0.093) (0.095) 
GROWTH -1.005 -0.003 -0.029 -0.030 -0.007 -0.004 -0.024 -0.030 
 (0.010) (0.011) (0.020) (0.019) (0.012) (0.011) (0.019) (0.019) 
ROA -0.129 -0.116 -0.081 -0.125 -0.125 -0.114 -0.071 -0.125 
 (0.084) (0.091) (0.017) (0.169) (0.138) (0.091) (0.157) (0.168) 
CFO -0.078 -0.101*    -0.880***    -0.848*** -0.084 -0.104*    -0.850***  -0.849*** 
 (0.058) (0.060) (0.115) (0.111) (0.085) (0.060) (0.108) (0.111) 
IPO -0.006 -0.002 0.058 0.038 -0.007 -0.002 0.062 0.039 
 (0.083) (0.084) (0.164) (0.156) (0.040) (0.084) (0.154) (0.155) 
OWNERSHIP -0.032 -0.100 -0.048 -0.029 -0.084 -0.103 -0.057 -0.031 
 (0.110) (0.0112) (0.218) (0.207) (0.014) (0.112) (0.205) (0.206) 
Intercept      0.193*** 0.193** 0.170 0.112    0.204***    0.218** 0.115    0.193** 
 (0.086) (0.094) (0.170) (0.174) (0.035) (0.094) (0.159) (0.174) 
Observations 932 932 932 932 932 932 932 932 
Year F.E. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm F.E. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R-squared 
(within) 




Note: The regression is based on a sample of Big4 clients consistent with Cameran et al. (2016). 
PERIOD2 is a dummy variable = 1 in the years 4 to 7 of audit firm tenure, and zero otherwise; 
PERIOD 3 is a dummy variable 
= 1 in the years 6 to 9 of audit firm tenure, and zero otherwise; IPO is a dummy = 1 if an IPO was 
launched in year t; OWNERSHIP is a dummy = 1 if a major shareholder owns more than 50% of 






Table A11 - Chen et al. (2018) 
Panel A: Table 3 - Mandatory rotation and reporting quality (2006-2012) 
 
Dependent variable: CA ΔAR 
PMROT    -0.022**      -0.003** 
 (0.012) (0.001) 
FMROT    0.038** 0.001 
 (0.016) (0.002) 
Controls Yes Yes 
Year F.E Yes Yes 
Firm F.E Yes Yes 
Observations 912 1100 
R-squared (within) 0.056 0.034 
 
Note: This table presents the regression results of the Chen et al.’s (2018) single-step equation 
for current assets (CA) and change in receivables (ΔAR) (omitting time and firm subscripts, unless 
necessary for clarity):  
CA = α0+ α1 PMROT + α2FMROT + α3AGE + α4BIG + α5SIZE + α6LOSS + α7LEV + 
α8GROWTH + α9ROA + α10CFO + β1CFOi,t-1 + β2CFOi,t+1 + β3ΔAR+  β4PPE + Year F.E. + Firm F.E. 
+ ε 
 
ΔAR  = α0+ α1 PMROT + α2FMROT + α3AGE + α4BIG + α5SIZE + α6LOSS + α7LEV + 
α8GROWTH + α9ROA + α10CFO + β1ΔRevi,t  + Year F.E. + Firm F.E. + ε 
 
For both regressions we utilize robust variance estimates clustered at the individual firm level. All 
continuous variables are winzorised at the top and bottom 1%. All other variables are defined in 





Panel B: Table 4 - Mandatory rotation and reporting quality: year of rotation vs. the preceding 
year (2006-2012) 
Dependent variable: CA ΔAR 
PMROT -0.004 -0.001* 
 (0.011) (0.001) 
FMROT       0.058*** 0.001 
 (0.020) (0.001) 
Controls Yes Yes 
Year F.E Yes Yes 
Firm F.E Yes Yes 
Observations 270 297 
R-squared (within) 0.216 0.105 
 
Note: This table presents the regression results of the Chen et al.’s (2018) single-step equations 
for current assets (CA) and change in receivables (ΔAR) (omitting time and firm subscripts, unless 
necessary for clarity):  
CA = α0 + α1 PMROT + α2FMROT + α3AGE + α4BIG + α5SIZE + α6LOSS + α7LEV + 
α8GROWTH + α9ROA + α10CFO + β1CFOi,t-1 + β2CFOi,t+1 + β3ΔAR+  β4PPE + Year F.E. + Firm F.E. 
+ ε 
 
ΔAR  = α0+ α1 PMROT + α2FMROT + α3AGE + α4BIG + α5SIZE + α6LOSS + α7LEV + 
α8GROWTH + α9ROA + α10CFO + β1ΔRevi,t  + Year F.E. + Firm F.E. + ε 
 
For both regressions we utilize robust variance estimates clustered at the individual firm level. All 
continuous variables are winzorised at the top and bottom 1%. All other variables are defined in 





Panel C: Table 5 - Mandatory audit firm rotation and reporting quality during single rotation 
regime (1993 – 2004) 
Dependent variable: CA ΔAR 
FMROT 0.004 -0.308 
 (0.010) (0.339) 
Controls Yes Yes 
Year F.E Yes Yes 
Firm F.E Yes Yes 
Observations 694 860 
R-squared (within) 0.086 0.129 
 
Note: This table presents the regression results of the Chen et al.’s (2018) single-step equation 
for current assets (CA) (omitting time and firm subscripts, unless necessary for clarity):  
CA = α0 + α1 PMROT + α2FMROT + α3AGE + α4BIG + α5SIZE + α6LOSS + α7LEV + 
α8GROWTH + α9ROA + α10CFO + β1CFOi,t-1 + β2CFOi,t+1 + β3ΔAR+  β4PPE + Year F.E. + Firm F.E. 
+ ε 
 
We utilize robust variance estimates clustered at the individual firm level. All continuous variables 
are winzorised at the top and bottom 1%. All other variables are defined in Appendix 1. Standard 




Panel D: Table 6 - Mandatory audit firm rotations and reporting quality pre and post dual audit 
rotation regime (1993 – 2012) 
 
Dependent variable: CA ΔAR 
POST06       0.021*** -0.780 
 (0.007) (1.128) 
FMROT 0.000 0.431 
 (0.009) (0.314) 
FMROT*POST06 -0.010 0.576 
 (0.014) (0.371) 
Controls Yes Yes 
Year F.E Yes Yes 
Firm F.E Yes Yes 
Observations 1606 1960 
R-squared (within) 0.062 0.163 
 
Note: This table presents the regression results of the Chen et al.’s (2018) single-step equation 
for current assets (CA) and change in receivables (ΔAR) (omitting time and firm subscripts, unless 
necessary for clarity):  
CA = α0 + α1POST06 + α2FMROT + α3FMROT* POST06+ α4AGE + α5BIG + α6SIZE + α7LOSS 
+ α8LEV + α9GROWTH + α10ROA + α11CFO + β1CFOi,t-1 + β2CFOi,t+1 + β3ΔAR+  β4PPE + Year 
F.E. + Firm F.E. + ε 
 
ΔAR  = α0 + α1POST06+ α2FMROT + α3FMROT*POST06 + α4AGE + α5BIG + α6SIZE + α7LOSS 
+ α8LEV + α9GROWTH + α10ROA + α11CFO + β1ΔRev  + Year F.E. + Firm F.E. + ε 
 
For all regressions we utilize robust variance estimates clustered at the individual firm level. All 
continuous variables are winzorised at the top and bottom 1%. All other variables are defined in 




Table A12 – Aobdia (2019) 
Panel A: Table 3 - Mandatory rotation and reporting quality (2006-2012) 
 






Year F.E Yes 




Note: This table presents the regression results of the logit model: 
 
Prob(0<ROA<0.03) = α0 + α1 PMROT + α2FMROT + α3AGE + α4BIG + α5SIZE + 
α6LOSS + α7LEV + α8GROWTH + α9ROA + α10CFO +  Year F.E. + Firm F.E. + ε 
 
where SPOS = 1 if 0<ROA<0.03 
 
We utilize robust variance estimates clustered at the individual firm level. All continuous 
variables are winzorised at the top and bottom 1%. All other variables are defined in 
Appendix 1. Standard errors are reported in parenthesis. ***, **, * denote significance at the 1, 










Panel B: Table 4 - Mandatory rotation and reporting quality: year of rotation vs. the 
preceding year (2006-2012) 
Dependent variable: SPOS 





Year F.E Yes 




Note: This table presents the regression results of the logit model: 
 
Prob(0<ROA<0.03) = α0 + α1 PMROT + α2FMROT + α3AGE + α4BIG + α5SIZE + 
α6LOSS + α7LEV + α8GROWTH + α9ROA + α10CFO +  Year F.E. + Firm F.E. + ε 
 
where SPOS = 1 if 0<ROA<0.03 
 
We utilize robust variance estimates clustered at the individual firm level. All continuous 
variables are winzorised at the top and bottom 1%. All other variables are defined in 
Appendix 1. Standard errors are reported in parenthesis. ***, **, * denote significance at the 1, 











Panel C: Table 5 - Mandatory audit firm rotation and reporting quality during single 
rotation regime (1993 – 2004) 
 
Dependent variable: SPOS 
FMROT -0.185 
   (0.350) 
Controls Yes 
Year F.E Yes 




Note: This table presents the regression results of the logit model: 
 
Prob(0<ROA<0.03) = α0 + α1FMROT + α2AGE + α3BIG + α4SIZE + α5LOSS + α6LEV + 
α7GROWTH + α8ROA + α9CFO +  Year F.E. + Firm F.E. + ε 
 
where SPOS = 1 if 0<ROA<0.03 
 
We utilize robust variance estimates clustered at the individual firm level. All continuous 
variables are winzorised at the top and bottom 1%. All other variables are defined in 
Appendix 1. Standard errors are reported in parenthesis. ***, **, * denote significance at the 1, 















Panel D: Table 6 - Mandatory audit firm rotations and reporting quality pre and post 
dual audit rotation regime (1993 – 2012) 








Year F.E Yes 




Note: This table presents the regression results of the logit model: 
 
Prob(0<ROA<0.03) = α0 + α1POST06+ α2FMROT + α3FMROT *POST06 + α3AGE + 
α4BIG + α5SIZE + α6LOSS + α7LEV + α8GROWTH + α9ROA + α10CFO +  Year F.E. + 
Firm F.E. + ε 
 
where SPOS = 1 if 0<ROA<0.03 
 
We utilize robust variance estimates clustered at the individual firm level. All continuous 
variables are winzorised at the top and bottom 1%. All other variables are defined in 
Appendix 1. Standard errors are reported in parenthesis. ***, **, * denote significance at the 1, 
5 and 10 % respectively. 
 
 
 
 
 
